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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant concede that this Court has jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's Appeal. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Because disposition of a case on summary judgment denies the benefit of a trial on 
the merits, the appellate court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
losing party, and affirm only where it appears there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
issues of fact, or where, even according to the facts as contended by the losing party, the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Themy v. Seagull Enterprises., 
Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is a case in which Plaintiff/Appellant seeks to recover damages from selected 
entities involved within a chain of transfers of a motor vehicle. Plaintif^Appellant contends 
that the subject vehicle was a salvage vehicle and that he was not apprised of that fact and 
withholding of that information gave rise to statutory and common law causes of action. 
PROCEEDINGS AT THE TRIAL LEVEL 
After discovery and limited motion practice Defendants/Appellees brought Motions 
for Summary Judgment which Motions were granted by the trial court. In granting 
Summary Judgment the Court disposed of all issues of fact and law in favor or 
Defendant/Appellees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about the 12th day of February 1997 the Defendant Economy Auto Inc. 
was served with a Summons and Complaint in this action. The Defendant Economy Auto 
Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah with it's 
principal place of business in Cache County, State of Utah. 
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2. Defendant American States Insurance Co., an insurance company doing 
business in Utah was likewise served with Summons and Complaint. 
3. Sometime thereafter Defendant Clarendon National Insurance Co. Was 
likewise served. 
4- The Defendant Clarendon National Insurance Co. Is a corporation organized 
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New Jersey and is qualified to 
transact business in the State of Utah. 
5. The Defendant Economy Auto is a licensed and bonded motor vehicle dealer 
pursuant to The Utah Motor Vehicle Act. 
6. The Defendant Economy Auto Inc. does not, as a principal part of it's 
business, offer automobiles to the public at retail, but concentrates on selling motor vehicles 
and motor vehicle parts at wholesale but routinely sells motor vehicle parts at retail as well. 
Occasionally Economy Auto Inc. will sell a used motor vehicle at retail but does not solicit 
this type of business. Economy Auto does not maintain a retail sales lot, advertise retail 
sales or have a staff versed in retail sale, techniques and practices. 
7. The Defendant Economy Auto Inc. is party to that certain Motor Vehicle 
Dealers Bond # 95054257 as a principal and the Defendanl Clarendon National Insurance 
Co. Is named therein as a surety and each is bound to the State of Utah as per their 
undertaking in fulfillment of applicable law. 
8. At all times relevant to this proceeding the bond above referenced was in full 
force and effect in this jurisdiction and provided such assurances and protections as are 
required by Utah law. 
9. This case involves a certain "Hummer" motor vehicle 
VIN#137YA843XRE152325 which motor vehicle was manufactured by American General 
Corporation of South Bend, Indiana; a domestic corporation in the business of 
manufacturing new automobiles. 
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16. Ultimately, Hillcrest Service transferred their purchased interest to Plaintiff 
and Plaintiff ultimately acquired the titled interest of Christensen subject to a security 
interest held by Zions Bank, the entity from which Plaintiff borrowed a portion of the 
purchase price. 
17. At the time that each of these transactions occurred the subject motor vehicle 
was located in Salt Lake County or Davis County, and was not then nor never was registered 
to or in the physical possession of any of the Defendants. 
18. Plaintiff personally inspected the vehicle before he purchased it while it was 
at Carlson Cadillac in Salt Lake County, again while it was at Utah Auto Auction in Davis 
County, Utah and again while it was in the possession of Hillcrest Service in Salt Lake 
County. 
19. While the subject motor vehicle was at Carlson Cadillac in its damaged 
condition the Plaintiff attempted to purchase the interest of American States but was 
unsuccessful and upon learning of the transfer to the Defendant Economy Auto contacted 
one of Economy's principals, Charlie Fullmer, again attempting to purchase the subject 
motor vehicle. Fullmer as manager of Economy Auto, offered to sell the interest of 
Economy Auto Inc. to Plaintiff for about $17,000.00 but Plaintiff did not accept the offer, 
but did offer to pay Economy Auto $15,000.00. 
20. In the course of various unrelated business dealings between Economy Auto 
Inc. and Western Affiliated1, Western Affiliated developed a purpose to offer the subject 
motor vehicle for sale in it's damaged condition at a public auction conducted by Utah Auto 
Auction. Western Affiliated, for consideration, took transfer of the interest of Economy 
Auto Inc. and took physical possession of the motor vehicle from Carlson Cadillac and 
arranged for the transportation of said motor vehicle to the premises of Utah Auto Auction 
Western affiliated, a non party, is reputed to have been a dealer in used motor vehicles at 
all pertinent times and may well have been bonded by Defendant Clarendon National The business has now been 
sold to Copart Inc , which is still dealing in motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts, the present status of 
Western Affiliated is unclear 
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An interesting question arises from this transfer: does Plaintiff assert that the November 1998 
transaction create new and separate causes of action whereby the transfer of Plaintiff's interest might proceed 
against American States, Economy Auto, Western Affiliated, Utah Auto Auction, Hillcrest Services and James 
Gordon Holmes? 
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27. Liability of Defendant Clarendon National must be predicated on a finding 
of liability on the part of Defendant Economy Auto Inc., Defendant Clarendon has never 
had any interest in or possession of the subject vehicle and is merely a surety for Defendant 
Economy Auto. 
28. Defendant Economy Auto never transferred the motor vehicle in question to 
itself or back to itself despite Plaintiff's allegation which surfaced for the first time in 
Plaintiff/Appellants Brief at page 5. 
ISSUES 
I. Does Utah Law, under the facts of this case, impose upon an entity acquiring 
such interest as that acquired by Defendant Economy Auto and it's subsequent transferees 
in this case, the duty to surrender title to the Utah State Department of Motor Vehicles for 
the purpose of obtaining a salvage title? 
II. May the Plaintiff, under the facts of this case, prove damages in the absence 
of issuance of a salvage title? 
III. Respecting the facts and pleadings of this case, do the Consumer Sales 
Practices Act and the Uniform Commercial Code address the transaction in question? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Plaintiff, at the trial level, presented no competent evidence that the motor 
vehicle in question is or was salvage and, in fact, all evidence admissible on that point at the 
trial level was to the contrary. 
The new vehicle warranty was unimpaired throughout it's intrinsic duration. 
If the Plaintiff relies on statutory damages only, he neither pleaded nor proved facts 
that give rise to a cause of action under the statute. 
The Defendant has neither pleaded nor proved actual damage. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. Does Utah Law, under the facts of this case, impose upon an entity acquiring 
such interest as that acquired by Defendant Economy Auto and it's subsequent transferees 
in this case, the duty to surrender title to the Utah State Department of Motor Vehicles for 
the purpose of obtaining a salvage title? 
29. Under certain narrowly construed circumstances, certain classes of entities may 
be required to surrender a Utah Motor Vehicle title and obtain therefore a salvage title in 
the process of transferring their interest. The code sections relied upon by Plaintiff are 
UCA 41-la-1004(2) and UCA 41-la-1005(4).3 
30. Plaintiff maintains that neither the Defendants American States nor the 
Defendant Economy Auto, nor the non-parties Western Affiliated, Utah Auto Auction and 
Hillcrest Service, in not Procuring a salvage title, did nothing to violate UCA 41-3-702 
(l)(c)(VI) and 41-3-701 (3). 
31. UCA 41-la-1004 to become operative, subsumes that a salvage certificate or 
branded title has been issued so whether or not any of the Defendants may be or may not 
be sellers becomes moot in that the pleadings of Plaintiff and the deposition in this case 
discloses that no such title was issued or procured; (see deposition of James G. Holmes Page 
93 , Line 24,) In view of the clear wording of the statute relied on by Plaintiff any claim 
based on that statute must be denied. In K&T, Inc. v. KOROULIS 888 P2d 623, 627 (Utah 
1994) the court held that each term in a statute was '"used advisedly; thus the statutory 
words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable.". 
32. 41-la-1005 provides in pertinent part that "if an insurance Co. Declares a 
vehicle a salvage vehicle and takes possession of the vehicle for disposal..." In this case, 
See Addendum A for full text 
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neither of the Insurance Company's involved, they being Defendants American States and 
Clarendon National respectively, declared the 1994 Hummer to be a salvage vehicle (see 
affidavit of Charles Fullmer ) nor did either of the Defendant insurance companies take 
Possession of the motor vehicle for disposal (see affidavit of Charlie Fullmer). Since neither 
of the two conditions precedent occurred the Plaintiff enjoys no rights under section 1005. 
33. 41-la-1001 defined salvage vehicle as "[any vehicle][that] is: 
a) damaged by collision, flood, or other occurrence to the extent that 
the cost of repairing the vehicle for safe operation exceeds its fair 
market value; or b) that has been declared a salvage vehicle by an 
insurer of other state or jurisdiction, but is not precluded from further 
registration and titling. 
34. In this case the motor vehicle in question had not been declared a salvage 
vehicle by the an insurer of another State or Jurisdiction, nor had the motor vehicle been 
damaged to the extent that the cost of repair exceeded the fair market value; see deposition 
of James Gordon Holmes P.47 Line 14; the cost of repair approximating $8,500.00 while the 
fair market value as repaired exceeds $35,000.00. (See deposition of J.G. Holmes, P48, Line 
5 and affidavit of Charles Fullmer). As the undisputed facts establish, Mr. Fullmer offered 
the vehicle to Plaintiff for $17,000 making the cost to the Plaintiff, with repairs $25,000.00. 
What Plaintiff later elected to pay becomes immaterial, it is apparent that Plaintiff having 
approached the Insurance company first, might well have obtained the vehicle for the initial 
purchase price, that being $12,000.00. See affidavit of C. Fullmer. 
35. The fact is, the motor vehicle in question was not salvage and no proof of that 
fact exists. All of the Statutes adopted by Plaintiff are predicated on the 1994 Hummer 
being a "salvage vehicle" and there being no proof of that fact Plaintiff's entire case falls in 
of it's own weight and is subject to summary disposition under Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 56. 
36. Plaintiff points to the alleged assumption of a member of the clerical staff at 
American States Insurance Company that someone should have surrendered the title to the 
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State for a salvage designation. Conclusory statements are not admissible and will not serve 
to establish a controverting fact. Western Thrift and Loan v. Bloomquist 29 Ut 2.d 274, 504 
P2.d 1019 (1972). 
37. Likewise the Affidavit of Danny Jensen relied on by Plaintiff/Appellant is not 
based on personal knowledge and inspection but is based on heresay reports prepared by 
others. Again, such assertions are not admissible as evidence upon which the court might 
base a finding of fact. Treloqqan v. Treloggan 699 P2.d 747 (Utah 1985). 
38. Plaintiff presses other points whereby Plaintiff would have the Court consider 
and give weight to the conclusory acts of others, such as an unknown person making a 
notation on an invoice or an unknown person on the telephone making a statement of fact 
concerning the salvage nature of the motor vehicle utilizing information gleaned from an 
unknown source. 
The prior 3 paragraphs summarize Plaintiff's proof as to the salvage nature of the 
subject motor vehicle, from this perspective alone we are left with nothing to controvert the 
Affidavit of Charlie Fullmer the Affidavit of the employee of American General and/or the 
undeniable mathematical truth drawn from figures given in the depositions of Plaintiff. 
II. May the Plaintiff, under the facts of this case, prove damages in the absence 
of issuance of a salvage title? 
39. There is no cited case known to Defendant where recovery has been allowed 
(or even sought) for non-designation as salvage of an un-repaired vehicle unless there has 
been active concealment of a latent defect. 
40. The fact that an insurance company pays an insured a sum of money and takes 
possession of an insured vehicle does not ipso facto create a salvage vehicle. Christensen 
was paid the cash value of his vehicle prior to the damage; this does not mean that the 
vehicle was salvage it just means that the Insurance company, at it's election, paid in accord 
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with what was deemed to be it's contractual obligation. The insurer then transferred it's 
interest in the damaged vehicle for the best price obtainable, not necessarily the salvage 
price. It is apparent from the prices paid by various dealers or the acts of Plaintiff that the 
motor vehicle was thought to have considerable worth and utility despite the damage it had 
sustained. 
41. While it is possible that issuance of a salvage title might well decrease the 
value of a motor vehicle for resale, the notation on the title could not conceivable affect the 
intrinsic value or utility of the motor vehicle. (See affidavit of Charlie Fullmer.) Likewise 
if the vehicle has a "clean title" how can that fact adversely affect its worth? 
42. Plaintiff admittedly purchased the vehicle with full knowledge of the damage 
and made the purchase for his own use and after accomplishing the contemplated repairs 
he did, until the sale in November of 1998, use the motor vehicle for all of the uses he 
originally contemplated at the time of purchase. The value of the motor vehicle to Plaintiff 
could not be enhanced by the act of placing a salvage notation on the title. 
POINT III. Respecting the facts of this case the Consumer Sales Practices Act and the 
Uniform Commercial Code do not control the transaction in question? 
43. Respecting the consumer sales practices act, UCA 13-11-1 et. Seq., Even if we 
assume Defendants are suppliers and Plaintiff is a consumer, which the defendants do not 
assume and do vigorously deny, these statutes have no application to the facts of the case. 
44. UCA 13-11-4 and 13-11-5 define the prohibited conduct and are attached 
hereto as part of the Addendum A and it is thereby apparent that the claims of Plaintiff lie 
without the prohibitions of that legislation. 
45. In the recent case of WOODHAVEN v. WASHINGTON 907 P2d 271 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1995) Rvsd on 22 July, 1997 the Court addressed the unconscionability provisions of 
the act and the Court observed, with respect to a claim for damages, that to be 
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unconscionable the circumstances must be such as to be oppressive and to unfairly surprise 
the claimant. Nothing alleged or pleaded by the Plaintiff even addresses this standard, let 
alone approaches the burden the standard imposes. 
46. It is said that to be an actionable deceptive practice the practice must A) be 
a deceptive act or practice as defined by UCA 13-11-4 ; B) and must be done intentionally 
by the Defendant contemplating that Plaintiff will rely on the deception and C) the 
deception must occur in a course of conduct involving trade or commerce. In this case it 
cannot be denied, and the trial court so found, that the Plaintiff was, at the time he acquired 
title to the vehicle, better informed than any party to this transaction, at any time, as to the 
true condition of the motor vehicle. P.24 Line 1-18 (Deposition of Plaintiff Holmes taken 
on April 7, 1997). 
47. Reference to UCA 70A could well complicate Plaintiff's claims further when 
one looks 70A-2-1044 as to "transactions between merchants";5 Other than the implications 
of that section it is difficult to find where the UCC creates or provides a cause of action 
based on failure to procure a "salvage title". 
48. Contrary to assertions by Plaintiff, no named Defendant can be said to have 
any fiduciary relationship with Defendant, whether it be created by statute or by case law 
and it is further apparent that Defendant is not now nor has he ever been under any 
disability or nor can it be said that Plaintiff occupied a legally disadvantaged position; how 
then does the Plaintiff claim Defendant's have a fiduciary duty? 
See Addendum for full text 
See Addendum for full text 
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CONCLUSION 
the most important single fact disclosed during the trial proceedings was that none 
of the transferees of the interest of Christensen treated the subject vehicle as salvage but 
only as a vehicle which was in need of limited repair to become fully functional. That fact 
coupled with the legal infirmities of the Plaintiff's position compelled a finding by the Trial 
Court that the subject vehicle was not a salvage vehicle. 
Since there were no actual damages, any damages must be predicated on the statute 
and since no violation of any statute has occurred Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which 
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A D D E N D U M A 
ADDENDUM A 
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE AND OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL: 
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act: 
13-11-2. Construction and purposes of act. 
This act shall be construed liberally to promote the following policies: 
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing consumer 
sales practices; 
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and 
unconscionable sales practices; 
(3) to encourage the development of fair consumer sales practices; 
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales practices not 
inconsistent with the policies of the Federal Trade Commission Act relating 
to consumer protection; 
(5) to make uniform the law, including the administrative rules, with 
respect to the subject of this act among those states which enact similar 
laws; and 
(6) to recognize and protect suppliers who in good faith comply 
with the provisions of this act. 
13-11-3. Definitions. 
(2) "Consumer transaction" means a sale, lease, assignment, award 
by chance, or other written or oral transfer or disposition of goods, services, or 
other property, both tangible and intangible (except securities and insurance), to 
a person for primarily personal, family, or household purposes, or for purposes 
that relate to a business opportunity that requires both his expenditure of money 
or property and his personal services on a continuing basis and in which he has 
not been previously engaged, or a solicitation or offer by a supplier with respect 
to any of these transfers or dispositions. It includes any offer or solicitation, any 
agreement, any performance of an agreement with respect to any of these 
transfers or dispositions, and any charitable solicitation as defined in this section. 
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, government, 
governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, 
association, cooperative, or any other legal entity. 
(6) "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, broker, or 
other person who regularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer transactions, 
whether or not he deals directly with the consumer. 
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13-11-4. Deceptive act or practice by supplier. 
(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer 
transaction violates this chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction. 
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier commits a 
deceptive act or practice if the supplier knowingly or intentionally: 
(a) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has sponsorship, 
approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits, if it 
has not; 
(b) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is of a particular 
standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if it is not; 
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or unused, 
if it is not, or has been used to an extent that is materially different from the 
fact; 
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied 
in accordance with a previous representation, if it has not; 
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or does not involve a 
warranty, a disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty terms, or other 
rights, remedies, or obligations, if the representation is false; 
13-11-5. Unconscionable act or practice by supplier. 
(1) An unconscionable act or practice by a supplier in connection with a 
consumer transaction violates this act whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction. 
(2) The unconscionability of an act or practice is a question of law for the 
court. If it is claimed or appears to the court that an act or practice may be 
unconscionable, the parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to present 
evidence as to its setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making its 
determination. 
(3) In determining whether an act or practice is unconscionable, the court 
shall consider circumstances which the supplier knew or had reason to know. 
13-11-19. Actions by consumer. 
(1) Whether he seeks or is entitled to damages or otherwise has an 
adequate remedy at law, a consumer may bring an action to: 
(a) obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this 
chapter; and 
(b) enjoin, in accordance with the principles of equity, a supplier who has 
violated, is violating, or is likely to violate this chapter. 
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(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter 
may recover, but not in a class action, actual damage or $2,000, whichever is 
greater, plus court costs. 
(5) Except for services performed by the enforcing authority, the court may 
award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee limited to the work 
reasonably performed if: 
(a) the consumer complaining of the act or practice that violates this 
chapter has brought or maintained an action he knew to be groundless; or a 
supplier has committed an act or practice that violates this chapter; and 
(b) an action under this section has been terminated by a judgment or 
required by the court to be settled under Subsection 13-1 l-21(l)(a). 
13-11-23. Other remedies available—Class action only as prescribed by 
act. 
The remedies of this act are in addition to remedies otherwise available for 
the same conduct under state or local law, except that a class action relating to a 
transaction governed by this act may be brought only as prescribed by this act. 
Utah Motor Vehicle Dealer Act: 
41-la-1001. Definitions 
(6) "Salvage vehicle" means any vehicle: 
(a) damaged by collision, flood, or other occurrence to the extent 
that the cost of repairing the vehicle for safe operation exceeds its fair 
market value; or 
41-la-1004. Certificate of title - Salvage vehicles 
(2) Before the sale of a vehicle for which a salvage certificate or branded 
title has been issued, the seller shall provide the prospective purchaser with written 
notification that a salvage certificate or a branded title has been issued for the 
vehicle. 
41-la-1005. Salvage vehicle - Declaration by insurance company -
Surrender of title - Salvage certificate of title. 
(1) (a) (i) If an insurance company declares a vehicle a salvage vehicle 
and takes possession of the vehicle for disposal, or an insurance 
company pays off the owner of a vehicle that is stolen and not 
recovered, the insurance company shall within tern days from the 
settlement of the loss surrender to the division the outstanding 
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certificate of title, properly endorsed, or other evidence of 
ownership acceptable to the division, 
(d) (i) If a dealer licensed under Title 41, Chapter 3, Part 2, Licensing, 
takes possession of any salvage vehicle for which there is not 
already issued a branded title or salvage certificate from the 
division or another jurisdiction, the dealer shall within ten days 
surrender to the division the certificate of title or other evidence of 
ownership acceptable to the division, 
(ii) The division shall then issue a salvage certificate in the 
applicant's name. 
(2) Any person, insurance company, or dealer licensed under Title 41, 
Chapter 3, Part 2, Licensing, who fails to obtain a salvage certificate as required in 
this section or who sells a salvage vehicle without first obtaining a salvage 
certificate is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
41-la-1008. Criminal penalty for violation. 
It is a class A misdemeanor to knowingly violate Sections 41-1 a-1001 
through 41-la-1007, unless another penalty is specifically provided. 
41-3-205. Licenses—Bonds required—Maximum liability—Action against 
surety— 
(1) (a) Before a dealer's, special equipment dealer's, crusher's, or body 
shop's license is issued the applicant shall file with the administrator a 
corporate surety bond in the amount of: 
(i) $20,000 for a motor vehicle dealer's license or special 
equipment dealer's license; 
(ii) $1,000 for a motorcycle or small trailer dealer's or crusher's 
license; or 
(iii) $10,000 for a body shop's license. 
(b) The corporate surety shall be licensed 10 do business within the 
state. 
(c) The form of the bond: 
(i) shall be approved by the attorney general; 
(ii) shall be conditioned upon the applicant's conducting business 
as a dealer without fraud or fraudulent representation and without 
violating this chapter; and 
(iii) may be continuous in form. 
(d) The total aggregate annual liability on the bond to all persons 
making claims may not exceed the amount of the bond. 
(2) A cause of action under Subsection (1) may not be maintained 
against a surety unless: 
(a) a claim is filed in writing with the administrator within one year 
after the cause of action arose; and 
(b) the action is commenced within two years after the claim was 
filed with the administrator. 
(3) A person making a claim on the bond shall be awarded attorneys' fees 
in cases successfully prosecuted or settled against the surety or principal if the 
bond has not been depleted. 
41-3-210. License holders—Prohibitions. 
(1) The holder of any license issued under this chapter may not: 
(c) violate this chapter or the rules made by the administrator; 
(d) violate any law of the state respecting commerce in motor 
vehicles of any rule respecting commerce in motor vehicles made by 
any licensing or regulating authority of the state. 
41-3-404. Right of action against dealer, salesperson, crusher, body shop, or 
surety on bond. 
(1) A person may maintain an action against a dealer, crusher, or body ship 
on the corporate surety bond if: 
(a) the person suffers a loss or damage because of: 
(i) fraud; 
(ii) fraudulent representation; or 
(iii) a violation of: 
(A) this chapter; 
(B) any law respecting commerce in motor vehicles; or 
(C) a rule respecting commerce in motor vehicle made by a 
licensing or regulating authority; and 
(b) the loss or damage results from the action of: 
(i) a licensed dealer; 
(ii) a licensed dealer's salesperson action on behalf of the dealer or 
within the scope of the salesperson's employment; 
(iii) a licensed crusher; or 
(iv) a body shop. 
(2) Successive recovery against a surety on a bond is permitted, but the 
total aggregate annual liability on the bond to all persons making claims may not 
exceed the amount of the bond. 
(3) A cause of action may not be maintained against any surety under any 
bond required under this chapter except as provided in Section 41-3-205. 
41-3-701. Violations as misdemeanors. 
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(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter any person who violates 
this chapter or any rule made by the administrator is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(2) A person who violates Section 41-3-201 is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) A person who violates Section 41-3-301 is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor unless the selling dealer complies with the requirements of Section 
41-3-403. 
41-3-702, Civil penalty for violation. 
(3) The following are civil violations in addition to criminal violations 
under Section 41-la-1008: 
(a) knowingly selling a salvage vehicle, as defined in Section 41-1 a-
1001, without disclosing that the salvage vehicle has been repaired or 
rebuilt; 
(b) knowingly making a false statement on a vehicle damage disclosure 
statement, as defiled in Section 41-1 a-1001; or 
(c) fraudulently certifying that a damaged motor vehicle is entitled to 
an unbranded title, as defined in Section 41-1 a-1001, when it is not. 
(4) The civil penalty for a violation under Subsection (1) is: 
(a) not less than $1,000, or treble the actual damages caused by the 
person, whichever is greater; and 
(b) reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of the action. 
(5) A civil action may be maintained by a purchaser or by the 
administrator. 
Utah Administrative Code R873-22M-25 states: 
A. The Motor Vehicle Division shall brand a vehicle's title if, at 
the time of initial registration or transfer or ownership, evidence exists 
that the vehicle is a salvage vehicle. 
B. Written that a vehicle has been issued a salvage 
certificate or branded title shall be made to a prospective purchaser on 
a form approved by the Administrator of the Motor Vehicle 
Enforcement Division. 
C. The form must clearly and conspicuously disclose that the 
vehicle has been issued a salvage certificate or branded title. 
D. The form must be presented to and signed by the prospective 
purchaser and the prospective lien holder, if any, prior to the sale of 
the vehicle. 
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E. If the seller of the vehicle is a dealer, the form must be 
prominently displayed in the lower passenger-side comer of the 
windshield for the period of time the vehicle is on display for sale. 
F. The original disclosure form shall be given to the purchaser 
and a copy shall be given to the new lienholder, if any. A copy shall 
be kept on file by the seller for a period of three years from the date of 
sale if the seller is a dealer..) 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code: 
70A-1-102. Purposes—Rules of construction—Variation by agreement. 
(1) This act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its 
underlying purposes and policies. 
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this act are 
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial 
transactions; 
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through 
custom, usage and agreement of the parties; 
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions. 
(3) The effect of provisions of this act may be varied by agreement, except 
as otherwise provided in this act and except that the obligations of good faith, 
diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this act may not be disclaimed by 
agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the 
performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not 
manifestly unreasonable. 
(4) The presence in certain provisions of this act of the words "unless 
otherwise agreed" or words of similar import does not imply that the effect of 
other provisions may not be varied by agreement under Subsection (3). 
(5) In this act unless the context otherwise requires 
(a) words in the singular number include the plural, and in the plural 
include the singular; 
(b) words of the masculine gender include the feminine and the 
neuter, and when the sense so indicates words of the neuter gender may 
refer to any gender. 
70A-1-103. Supplementary general principles of law applicable. 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this act, the principles of 
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to 
contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, 
mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its 
provisions. 
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70A-1-106. Remedies to be liberally administered. 
(1) The remedies provided by this act shall be liberally administered to the 
end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party 
had fully performed but neither consequential or special nor penal damages may 
be had except as specifically provided in this act or by other rule of law. 
(2) Any right or obligation declared by this act is enforceable by action 
unless the provision declaring it specifies a different and limited effect. 
70A-1-201. General definitions. 
(3) "Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in 
their language or by implication from other circumstances including course 
of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided in 
Sections 70A-1-205 and 70A-2-208. Whether an agreement has legal 
consequences is determined by the provisions of this title, if applicable; 
otherwise by the law of contracts as provided in Section 70A-1-103. 
Compare the definition of "contract" in Subsection (11). 
(11) "Contract" means the total legal obligation which results from 
the parties' agreement as affected by this title and any other applicable rules 
of law. Compare the definition of "agreement" in Subsection (3). 
(15) "Document of title" includes bill of lading, dock warrant, dock 
receipt, warehouse receipt, or order for the delivery of goods, and also any 
other document which in the regular course of business or financing is 
treated as adequately representing that the person in possession of it is 
entitled to receive, hold and dispose of the document and the goods it 
covers. To be a document of title, a document must purport to be issued by 
oraddressed to a bailee and purport to cover goods in the bailee's 
possession which are either identified or are fungible portions of an 
identified mass. 
09) "Good faith" means honesty in fart in the conduct or 
transaction concerned. 
70A-1-203. Obligation of good faith. 
Every contract or duty within this act imposes an obligation of good faith in 
its performance or enforcement. 
70A-2-103. Definitions and index of definitions. 
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires 
(a) "Buyer" means a person who buys or contracts to buy goods. 
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(b) "Good faith" in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in 
the trade. 
(d) "Seller" means a person who sells or contracts to sell goods. 
70A-2-104. Definitions—"Merchant"- " Between merchants'5- "Financing 
agency." 
(1) "Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or 
otherwise by hib occupation hold* himself out as having knowledge or skill 
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such 
knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or 
oihci iinciinediary who by his occupation holds himself uul a* having such 
knowledge or skill. 
(2) "Financing agency" means a bank, finance company or other person 
who in the ordinary course of business makes advances against goods or 
documents of title or who by arrangement with either the seller or the buyer 
intervenes in ordinary course to make or collect payment due or claimed under the 
contract for sale, as by purchasing or paying the seller's draft or making advances 
against it or by merely taking it for collection whether or not documents of title 
accompany the draft. Financing agency" includes also a bank or other person who 
similarly intervenes between persons who are in the position of seller and buyer in 
respect to the goods (Section 701-2-707). 
(3) "Between merchants" means in any transaction with respect to which 
both parties are chargeable with the knowledge or skill of merchants. 
70A-2-105. Definitions—"Goods" 
(1) "Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods) 
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than 
the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (chapter 8) and 
things in action. 
(2) Goods must be both existing and identified before any interest in them 
can pass. Goods which are not both existing and identified are "future" goods. A 
purported present sale of future goods or of any interest therein operates as a 
contract to sell. 
(3) There may be a sale of a part interest in existing identified goods. 
70A-2-106. Definitions—"Contract"—"Agreement"—"Contract for sale"— 
"Sale"—"Present sale"—"Conforming" to contract— 
"Termination"-"Cancellation." 
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires "contract" and 
"agreement" are limited to those relating to the present or future sale of goods. 
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"Contract for sale" includes both a present sale of goods and a contract to sell 
goods at a future time. A "sale" consists in the passing of title from the seller to 
the buyer for a price (Section 70A-2-401). A "present sale" means a sale which is 
accomplished by the making of the contract. 
(2) Goods or conduct including any part of a performance are 
"conforming" or conform to the contract when they are in accordance with the 
obligations under the contract. 
(3) "Termination" occurs when either party pursuant to a power created by 
agreement or law puts an end to the contract otherwise than for its breach. On 
"termination" all obligations which are still executory on both sides are discharged 
but any right based on prior breach or performance survives. 
(4) "Cancellation" occurs when either party puts an end to the contract for 
breach by the other and its effect is the same as that of "termination" except that 
the canceling party also retains any remedy for breach of the whole contract or any 
unperformed balance. 
70A-2-302. Unconscionable contract or clause. 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse 
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable 
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any 
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to 
aid the court in making the determination. 
70A-2-312. Warranty of title and against infringement - Buyer's obligation 
against infringement. 
(2) A warranty under Subsection (1) will be excluded or modified only by 
specific language or by circumstances which give the buyer reason to know that 
the person selling does not claim title in himself or that he is purporting to sell 
only such right or title as he or a third person may have. 
70A-2-313. Express warranties by affirmation, promise, description, sample. 
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the 
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the 
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the 
affirmation or promise. 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of 
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to 
the description. 
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller 
use formal words such as "warrantor "guarantee" or that he have a specific 
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods 
or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the 
goods does not create a v/arranty. 
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TRELOGGAN v. TRELOGGAN 
Cite as 699 P^d 747 (Utah 1985) 
PER CURIAM: 
Utah 747 
rraham L. TRELOGGAN and Joyce S. 
Treloggan, Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Curtis L. TRELOGGAN and Julie A. 
Treloggan, and D & C Builders, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 19954. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 5, 1985. 
Mortgagees brought action to fore-
close on mortgage, and holder of judgment 
lien intervened. The Second District Court, 
Weber County, David E. Roth, J., granted 
mortgagees' motion for summary judg-
ment, and holder of judgment lien appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court held that affida-
vits on information and belief filed by hold-
er of judgment lien revealed no evidentiary 
facts, but merely reflected affiant's unsub-
stantiated opinions and conclusions, and 
thus were insufficient to raise issue of ma-
terial fact precluding summary judgment. 
Affirmed. 
1. Judgment <3=>185.1(3) 
Under summary judgment rule, an af-
fidavit on information and belief is insuffi-
cient to provoke genuine issue of fact. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(e). 
2. Judgment <s=>185.3(15) 
In action brought by mortgagees to 
foreclose on mortgage, affidavits on infor-
mation and belief filed by intervening hold-
er of judgment lien revealed no evidentiary 
facts, but merely reflected affiant's unsub-
stantiated opinions and conclusions, and 
th^c '..^rc ;rwUff.':':"t to raise issue of ma-
terial fact precluding summary judgment. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(e). 
Horace J. Knowlton, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and appellants. 
James R. Hasenyager, Ogden, for plain-
tiffs and respondents. 
This is an appeal from an order of the 
district court granting respondents' motion 
for summary judgment and dismissing ap-
pellant's complaint in intervention and sub-
sequent amended complaints. 
Respondents are the parents of defend-
ant Curtis Treloggan. On February 12, 
1979, Curtis and Julie Treloggan, his wife, 
borrowed $15,000 from respondents. A 
promissory note was signed which provided 
that the principal and interest (at 10% per 
annum) would be paid on or before Febru-
ary 2, 1980. To secure performance on the 
note, respondents took a mortgage on real 
property located in Weber County. The 
mortgage was recorded on February 13, 
1979. 
On March 1, 1979, appellant D & C Build-
ers obtained a judgment against Curtis and 
Julie Treloggan for money due on an open 
account. Subsequently, it filed a judgment 
lien against the Weber County property. 
When the promissory note was not paid 
within the time allotted, respondents filed a 
complaint to foreclose ^n the mortgage. In 
personal correspondence with the district 
court, Curtis and Julie Treloggan conceded 
default on the debt. D & C Builders filed 
an answer and counterclaim wherein it al-
leged that the conveyance to respondents 
was void, praying that it be declared the 
first lienholder. On June 16, 1980, the 
district court granted respondents summa-
ry judgment of foreclosure against Curtis 
and Julie Treloggan and ordered that ap-
pellant's interests be tried on its counter-
claim. 
Further proceedings against the property 
were stayed when Curtis and Julie Trelog-
gan filed for bankruptcy and the trustee in 
oanKrupic> a ^ u i ^ J control of the proper-
ty. When the property could not be sold 
for any amount greater than respondents' 
interest, the trustee abandoned the proper-
ty in January 1984. 
On February 22, 19? \ respondents filed 
a motion for summarv iudgment dismissing 
D & C Builders' complaint in intervention 
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and amended complaint. Respondents as-
serted that they were entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law since there was no 
genuine issue as to material fact. Respon-
dents' motion was supported by affidavits 
and other documents establishing that the 
$15,000 was in fact paid by respondents to 
their son and daughter-in-law in a purely 
arm's length transaction. In response, D 
& C Builders filed affidavits of its office 
manager alleging, upon information and 
belief, that the note and mortgage had 
been given to defraud D & C Builders and 
to frustrate collection of its indebtedness. 
A hearing was held, and the trial court 
granted respondents' motion for summary 
judgment. The basis of the court's order 
was that respondents had established by 
affidavit that they had made a loan to 
Curtis and Julie Treloggan and that D & C 
Builders had failed to establish "by way of 
rebutting affidavits or other admissible evi-
dence" either that the loan was not made 
or that it was made to defraud D & C 
Builders. On appeal, D & C Builders chal-
lenges that decision. 
[1] Under Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e), an affi-
davit on information and belief is insuffi-
cient to provoke a genuine issue of fact. 
In Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation 
Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973), 
we held that an opposing affidavit under 
Rule 56(e): 
[M]ust be made on personal knowledge 
of the affiant, and set forth facts that 
would be admissible in evidence and 
show that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. 
Statements made merely on information 
and belief will be disregarded. 
In Joiits v. Hinkie, Utan, bll P.2d 733 
(1980), we cited Walker with approval and 
stated that when a motion for summary 
judgment is made under the Rule, "the 
affidavit of an adverse party must contain 
specific evidentiary facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial." We held 
that plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, defendants having failed to 
identify with specificity any material fact. 
[2] Appellant's affidavits in the instant 
case are deficient for the same reasons. 
The affidavits reveal no evidentiary facts, 
but merely reflect the affiant's unsubstan-
tiated opinions and conclusions in regard to 
the transactions concerned. 
The summary judgment is therefore af-
firmed. Costs to respondents. 
STEWART, J., does not participate here-
in. 
WOODHAVEN APARTMENTS v. WASHINGTON Utah 271 
Cite as 907 P.2d 271 (UtahApp. 1995) 
WOODHAVEN APARTMENTS, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Bertha WASHINGTON, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 940233-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 30, 1995. 
Landlord sought award of liquidated 
damages after tenant vacated apartment six 
months before lease term ended. The Third 
Circuit, West Valley Department, William A. 
Thome, J., found for landlord. Tenant ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Wilkins, J., 
held that: (1) liquidated damages provision 
was enforceable, and (2) provision wras not 
unconscionable. 
Affirmed. 
Orme, P.J., dissented and filed opinion. 
1. Appeal and Error <3=>1008.1(1) 
Court of Appeals gives deference to trial 
court's findings of fact. 
2. Appeal and Error <s*842(2) 
Court of Appeals reviews trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness. 
3. Damages <S=*78(6) 
Liquidated damage clause in lease, 
which assessed a fee of one and one-half 
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months rent if tenant vacated premises pre-
maturely but apartment was re-rented before 
expiration of lease, was enforceable, since it 
was a reasonable forecast of harm caused if 
tenant vacated early, and harm was difficult 
for parties to estimate when lease agreement 
was signed. 
4. Damages <s=*80(3) 
While reasonable correlation must exist 
between damages landlord actually incurs 
from tenant's breach of lease and liquidated 
damages provided for in lease, liquidated 
damages provision will only be declared void 
if any disparity between damages landlord 
incurred and those provided for in lease is 
grossly excessive and shocks the conscience. 
5. Damages ^^76 
Under basic principles of freedom of 
contract, stipulation to liquidated damages 
for breach of contract is generally enforce-
able. 
6. Contracts C=»l 
Parties may enter into contracts that 
later appear to be unfair or unreasonable, 
and may contract at arms length without 
intervention of courts to rescue one side from 
result of that bargain. 
7. Consumer Protection <£=>8 
Although favorable to landlord, liqui-
dated damages clause in apartment lease was 
not unconscionable under Utah Consumer 
Sales Practi es Art (UCSPA). U.C.A.1953, 
13-11-1 et seq. 
8. Damages <^78(6) 
In breach of lease situation, landlord is 
not prohibited from collecting liquidated 
damages instead of itemizing actual damages. 
Pr"r>o Plenk and Eric 
Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mittelstadt, Salt 
1. The lease provision reads in whole: 
2o. Should Resident \acate the premises pri-
or to the c\pu ation of the terms, Resident will 
be held responsible for the term ot tne leai>e. 
In the event that the apartment re-rents prior 
to the expiration of lease, Resident will be 
assessed a termination fee equal to one and 
one-half months[ ] rent 







WILKINS, Judge: -t| 
Bertha Washington appeals the lower; 
court's decision to grant Woodhaven Apart-11 
ments liquidated damages as a part of itsv 
judgment against her. We affirm. -is 
BACKGROUND -3 
i 
Woodhaven brought this action againsfi 
Washington for damages pursuant to their^  
lease agreement after Washington vacated' 
the apartment six months before the leasf! 
term ended. Paragraph 26 of the lease! 
agreement, which appeared immediately* 
above the signature line, provided that if; 
Washington vacated the premises before the1 
lease expired, she would be assessed a "ter-^  
mination fee equal to one and one-halft 
monthsf] rent" if the apartment was re-lei^  
before the lease expired.1 Because Woodhal 
ven re-let Washington's apartment only fif-l 
teen days after she vacated it, Washington, 
appeals the lower court's finding that the 
liquidated damages fee was enforceable and* 
the court's conclusion that contracting for thej 
fee was not an unconscionable act under the' 
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (UCS-J 
PA).2 Washington also argues that Utah lawl 
preh;v";s landlords fr^ m receiving liquidated^ 
damages awards. Z 
STANDARD OF REVIEW \% 
[1.2] We have given deference to theg 
trial court's findings of fact, see Reliance In$£ 
Co. v. Utah Deft of Transp., 8b8 P.2d I363g 
1367 (Utah 1993), but we have revised fig* 
correctness the trial court's conclusions that! 
the liquidated damages were not unconscitH* 
2. On appeal, neither party disputes the tnalj; 
court's determination that the contested l e a ^ 
provision is a liquidated damages clause or that! 
the UCSPA applies Consequently, uc do no9j 
address these conclusions. 
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tnd that landlords may receive liqui-
lamages for a tenant's breach of a 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-5(2) (1992); 




Wre hold that the liquidated damages 
n Washington's lease with Woodhaven 
under Utah law. Because it was a 
ible forecast of the harm caused if 
gton vacated early, and the harm was 
, for the parties to estimate when the 
- : J , -' ? liquid:- 1 
•s provision is enforceable. See Reli-
is. Co. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 858 
*63, 1367 (Utah 1993) (adopting Re-
>nt of Contracts § 339 (1932)). 
A reasonable correlation must exist 
a the damages Woodhaven actually 
d and those provided for in the con-
ic! Any disparity between the dam-
oodhaven incurred and those provided 
le liquidated damages provision "must 
issly excessive' and must 'shock the 
rice' of this court before we declare 
uidated damages void." Id. (citing 
i Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394, 397 (Utah 
see Young Elec. Sign Co. v. tyiited 
rd West, Inc., 755 P.2d 162, 164 (Utah 
noting that liquidated damages "are 
able if the amount of liquidated dam-
ped to is not disproportionate to the 
i compensatory damages and does not 
ite a forfeiture or a penalty''). The 
)urt found, and we agree, that the 
ed damages provision "does not shock 
science as being unfair or oppressive." 
iddition, the record indicates that 
iven incurs extra costs and expenses 
tenant terminates a lease early. For 
B, Woodhaven must perform addition-
IUJJU aiive work such as ensuring that 
aning and repairs are timely done, 
sing for the vacancy, showing the 
ent to prospective tenants, evaluating 
dit worthiness of prospective tenants, 
paring paperwork for the prospective 
• As the trial court found, an ^ssess-
" one and one-half months' rent is not 
out of proportion to the effort and resources 
required to re-let the apartment. The early 
termination assessment agreed to by the par-
ties was reasonable in light of the then-
anticipated expenses expected to be caused 
by Washington's possible early termination. 
The harm caused by Washington's breach 
was also difficult to accurately estimate when 
the parties contracted, so the second part of 
the legal test to determine the validity of 
liquidated damages is also met in this case. 
See Reliance Ins., 858 P.2d at 1368-70. The 
parties' lease was for one year. Neither 
Woodhaven nor Washington could know 
what the housing market would be uKe dur-
ing the coming year. Particularly, they 
could not know how long it would take 
Woodhaven to re-let Washington's apartment 
if she vacated before the lease ended. 
Therefore, since both prongs of the legal 
test are met, the liquidated damages provi-
sion is valid. First, the liquidated damages 
clause was a reasonable forecast, at the time 
the lease was entered into, of the damages 
Woodhaven would incur if Washington termi-
nated her lease early. Second, the harm was 
difficult for the parties to accurately estimate 
when the lease agreement was signed. 
[5] Furthermore, "'[ujnder the basic 
principles of freedom of contract, a stipula-
tion to liquidated damages for breach of con-
tract is generally enforceable.'" Allen, 723 
P.2d at 397 (quoting Warner v. Rasmussen, 
704 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah 1985) (citations omit-
ted)). It is reasonable that Woodhaven, 
which is comprised of 378 apartments, should 
be allowed to minimize its accounting costs of 
re-letting apartments that have been vacated 
early rather than requiring it to keep exact-
ing accounting records of individualized costs 
for each breach by a tenant of a lease agree-
ment. Using a liquidation clause also bene-
fits tenants because they know what cost will 
be assessed upon early vacancy. If actual 
costs were the only allowed measure of dam-
ages, some tenants would be required to pay 
more than the liquidated damages assess-
ment if the landlord was unable to re-let the 
vacated apartment for several months de-
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spite significant and potentially expensive ef-
forts to the contrary. 
We also affirm the trial court's legal con-
clusion that paragraph 26 was not unconscio-
nable despite Washington's argument that 
she lacked a meaningful choice regarding the 
liquidated damages clause. "Unconsciona-
ble," according to our supreme court, "is a 
term that defies precise definition. Rather, a 
court must assess the circumstances of each 
particular case in light of the twofold purpose 
oi the doctrine, pre\ eniion ui oppression and 
of unfair surprise.'' Resource Management 
Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co.. 706 
P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985). 
[6] Washington here claims oppression, 
rather than unfair surprise as the basis for 
finding paragraph 26 to be unconscionable. 
However, it is still the law in Utah that 
parties may contract at arms length without 
the intervention of the courts to rescue one 
side or the other from the result of that 
bargain. Id. at 1040. Parties are permitted 
to enter into contracts that later appear to be 
unfair or um-easonable. Id. "Although 
courts will not be parties to enforcing fla-
grantly unjust agreements, it is not for the 
courts to assume the paternalistic role of 
declaring that one wrho has freely bound him-
self need not perform because the bargain is 
not favorable." Bekins Bar V Ranch v. 
Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 19S3). 
[7] Having considered all the surround-
ing circumstances in this case, the "trial 
court did not find this contract to be uncon-
scionable, and there is no basis upon which 
we can say, as a matter of law, that he erred 
in his conclusion." Jacobson v. Sivan, 3 Utah 
2d 59, 67, 278 P.2d 294, 300 (1954). 
III. 
[8] Washington's argument that Utah law 
prohibits landlords from collecting liquidated 
damages awards has no ment. The trial 
court correctly concluded that Reid v. Mutu-
al of Omaha Insurance Co, 776 P.2d 896 
(Utah 1989), does not require the itemization 
of actual damages as the exclusive remedy 
for a Utah landlord in a breach of lea$£ 
situation. 
The liquidated damages provision of para! 
graph 26 bore a reasonable relationship tol 
the damage the parties anticipated Woodhal 
ven would incur if Washington terminated! 
her lease early, and the harm was difficult tol 
accurately estimate at the time the leasej 
agreement was signed. In addition, thj 
damages were not unconscionable under theP 
UCSPA, and they are allowed under Utafil 
law. We affirm. Cobts and atturney fee& 
are awarded to Woodhaven. 
GREENWOOD, J., concurs. 
ORME, Presiding Judge (dissenting). 
I dissent. In this case, the landlord rej 
ceived, as part of its judgment, the amount b| 
rent that was owed but not paid by the? 
tenant right up to the time the apartment 
was relet. In addition, the trial court stood, 
ready to awTard additional actual damages to* 
compensate for property damage caused byj 
the tenant, but found no such damage wasj 
proven by the landlord. Also, the lease pro^ 
vides that a portion of the money paid by thej 
tenant in advance is not refundable, but rath j^ 
er is earmarked for redecoration. p>| 
If the tenant remains contractually liable*' 
for actual rent unpaid up to the time ofj 
reletting, for the costs necessary to repair] 
any property damage, and for at least somV 
redecoration, wThat kind of damage is sought; 
to be covered by over $500 in additional 
liquidated damages? The trial court theo| 
rized that a landlord incurs other expense™ 
like running ads and posting signs to adver-^  
tise the vacancy, and that time must be speniE 
in showing the unit to prospective tenant^ 
and processing applications. Howrever, the; 
landlord's employee testified the real purposejj 
for the provision was to induce the tenant _t0j 
honor the lease obligations and the landlord^ 
attorney freely referred to it as a provision^  
to "penalize the tenant for not keeping the] 
ie*?e" Significantly, the landlord suffered* 
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•e are a number of bases upon which 
can invalidate liquidated damages pro-
which work such unjust results. One 
if the "party who would avoid a liqui-
damages provision" proves "no dam-
rere suffered or that there is no rea-
B relationship between compensatory 
[ddated damages." Young Elec. Sign 
United Standard West, Inc., 755 P.2d 
64 (Utah 1988). See also Allen v. 
on, 123 P.2d 394, 397 (Utah 1986) 
ig $10,800 "excessive and dispropor-
>" when compared to actual loss of 
and refusing to enforce liquidated 
es provision); Young Elec. Sign Co. v. 
564 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1977) (stating 
ited damages are considered a penalty, 
erefore unenforceable, "if the damages 
,tipulated are so excessive that they 
io reasonable relationship to the actual 
:es"). 
,he instant case, I must concede that 
lant's effort to meet her burden in this 
t was somewhat unfocused. Nonethe-
he import of the landlord's testimony, 
>ss-examination, was that this was a 
lation fee designed to induce compli-
or in counsel's words, to penalize non-
Lance) that was not really designed to 
pond to any particular range of proba-
4et expenditure. Although the land-
testimony was that it took an average 
days to re-rent an apartment (three 
f it was left clean), it was conceded that 
was no significant gap in occupancy 
>nd no appreciable effort was expended 
d a new tenant. More importantly, 
was no gap in the rents received by the 
rd, i.e., the landlord's judgment includ-
k
 amount of all unpaid rents owing but 
1 by the tenant right up to the time of 
mcy by the new tenant. 
n not prepared to say that no liquidated 
£es clause in a residential lease could 
>e upheld. The provision in this case, 
er, simply cannot be enforced where 
idlord sustained no demonstrable dam-
)ove and beyond the unpaid rent, prop-
3amagp, and redecoration expense it 
y is entitled to recover. The sum of 
is "excessive and disproportionate"1 
MERRITT Utah 275 
(UtahApp. 1995) 
when compared to no expense actually in-
curred, or even if compared to some modest 
imputed expense attributable to administra-
tive efforts to show a vacant unit, process an 
application, and fill in a few blanks on a lease 
form. 
At least on the facts of this case, the $531 
"fee" is exactly what the landlord's counsel 
called it—a penalty. Accordingly, I would 
amend the judgment appealed from to delete 
the penalty and leave the landlord to recover 
only its actual damages. 
«w v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394, 397 (Utah 
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Tim THEMY, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
SEAGULL ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, Shirley K. Watson, United 
Bank, a Utah Corporation, Zions First 
National Bank and Murray Broadcast-
ing C-rrr^any, Inc., Defendants and Ap-
pellants. 
No. 15641. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 4, 1979. 
In case concerning sale of radio station, 
comprised of real property, broadcasting 
equipment and FCC broadcasting license, in 
which case defendants, original buyer and 
its assignees, admitted that they had failed 
to make required payments pursuant to 
terms of two operative agreements, the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
David B. Dee, J., granted plaintiff subse-
quent buyer's motion for summary judg-
ment, declaring defendants' interests to be 
forfeited, and defendants appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Maughan, J., held that: (1) 
no material factual issue existed regarding 
subsequent buyer's right to bring instant 
action as successor to seller's interests in 
purchase agreements with original buyer; 
(2) no factual issue existed regarding subse-
quent buyer's compliance with remedial 
provisions of agreements, and (3) district 
court had power to adjudge that interests 
of defendants in FCC license described in 
and arising out of purchase agreement for 
sale of broadcasting equipment and license 
were forfeited by virtue of default of origi-
nal buyer thereunder, because case at hand 
was not one in which court had infringed 
upon jurisdiction of FCC, and (4) under 
applicable rule, appointment of receiver was 
proper, where subsequent buyer's motion 
for appointment had been made after de-
fendants filed their notice of appeal. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error e=>934(l), 1024.4 
In reviewing a case disposed of in dis-
trict court by summary judgment, Supreme 
Court considers evidence in light most fa-
vorable to losing party, and affirms only 
where it appears there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material issues of fact, or where, 
even according to facts as contended by 
losing party, moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a mazier of iu\v. RJICS ^I 
Civil Procedure, rule 56(c). 
2. Damages @=>85 
A forfeiture provision of a sales con-
tract will be upheld unless amounts re-
tained as liquidated damages are so great 
as to be unconscionable, or in nature of a 
penalty. 
3. Telecommunications <&=>402 
As assignees from defendant original 
buyer of radio station, defendants obtained 
only interests held by original buyer, and 
held those interests subject to original sell-
er's rights retained by him and later as-
signed to subsequent buyer plaintiff. 
4. Telecommunications <3=*402 
Subsequent buyer, as successor to sell-
er's interests, had right to bring action con-
cerning sale of radio station, comprised of 
real property, broadcasting equipment and 
FCC broadcasting license, where subse-
quent buyer had been assigned all seller's 
interests in his two agreements with origi-
nal buyer concerning sale, seller's prior as-
signment to bank affected only his interest 
in agreement concerning real estate, and 
was simply an assignment for security 
which accompanied a trust deed in favor of 
bank, and, although interests which seller 
assigned to subsequent buyer in real estate 
agreement were subject to security interest 
of bank, such did not divest seller of all 
interest in agreement. 
5. Telecommunications <s=»402 
Subsequent buyer, who, as successor to 
seller's interests in radio station sale agree-
ment between seller and original buyer, 
brought action concerning sale, had com-
plied with remedial provisions of agree-
ments, where notice of default was deliv-
ered to person, who was a vice president of 
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original buyer and manager of radio station 
operated by original buyer's assignee, such 
notice informed original buyer of subse-
quent buyer's election to declare forfeiture 
under agreements unless delinquent pay-
ments were made current within five days, 
and amount necessary to remedy default 
was specified, but no payments were made 
in response thereto. 
6. Appeal and Error c=> 170(1) 
Where although, in case concerning 
sale of radio station, comprised of real prop-
erty, broadcasting equipment and FCC 
broadcasting license, defendants made sev-
eral objections to validity of notice given by 
subsequent buyer, they raised such claims 
for first time before Supreme Gourt, such 
court declined to review them. 
7. Appeal and Error o» 170(1) 
In case concerning sale of radio station, 
simple response to defendants' contention 
that district court improperly decreed for-
feiture of $79,000 down payment made by 
original buyer defendant to seller, because 
forfeiture of so large a sum was uncon-
scionable penalty, was that judgment did 
not address matter of down payment; 
moreover, subsequent buyer plaintiff's 
amended complaint requested no determi-
nation with respect to down payment, and 
fact that defendants neither raised that is-
sue in their response to pleadings nor made 
any attempt before district court to have 
any portion of down payment returned 
meant that such issue was not properly 
before Supreme Court. 
8. Telecommunications <s=>402 
In case concerning sale of radio station, 
district court had power to adjudge that 
interests of defendants in FCC license de-
scribed in and arising out of purchase 
agreement for sale of license was forfeited 
by virtue of default of original buyer there-
under, where case was not one in which 
court had infringed upon jurisdiction of 
FCC, because judgment simply enforced 
terms of agreement providing for forfeiture 
upon default by original buyer, and de-
clared owner of interests in license to subse-
quent buyer, assignee of seller's interests in 
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purchase agreement with original buyer, 
and judgment did not require parties to 
take any specific action regarding a re-
transfer of license. Communications Act of 
1934, § 310(d), 47 U.S.C.A. § 310(d). 
9. Appeal and Error <®=>448 
Under rule providing that a receiver 
may be appointed by court after judgment 
to preserve property during pendency of an 
appeal, appointment of receiver in case con-
cerning sale of radio station, comprised of 
real property, broadcasting equipment and 
an FCC broadcasting license, was proper, 
where plaintiff subsequent buyer's motion 
for appointment had been made after de-
fendants filed their notice of appeal. Rules 
of Civil Procedure, rule 66. 
Gary A. Frank, Murray, Craig T. Vincent, 
W. Clark Burt, Salt Lake City, for defend-
ants and appellants. 
Steven H. Gunn, of Ray, Quinney & Ne-
beker, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and re-
spondent. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
This case concerns the sale of a radio 
station, comprised of real property, broad-
casting equipment and an FCC broadcast-
ing license. Defendants admitted they had 
failed to make the required payments pur-
suant to the terms of the two operative 
agreements, and the district court granted 
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, 
declaring the interests to be forfeited. De-
fendants contend factual issues prevent 
proper disposition by summary judgment, 
and the court improperly invaded the juris-
diction of the FCC by declaring defendants' 
interests in the license to be forfeited. We 
affirm, and award costs to plaintiff. 
On June 26, 1974, the owner of KMOR 
(now KPRQ) radio station, O. J. Wilkinson, 
entered into two written agreements for 
the sale of the station to defendant Seagull 
Enterprises, Inc. (hereafter Seagull). Al-
though one of the agreements concerned 
only the sale of the real property while the 
other concerned the sale of the personal 
528 Utah 595 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
property and the FCC license, both docu-
ments were executed simultaneously, and 
each expressly stated that a breach of one 
would constitute a breach of the other. 
The consummation of both documents was 
expressly conditioned upon FCC approval of 
the transfer of the broadcasting license to 
Seagull. Both documents were closely pat-
terned after the standard Uniform Real 
Estate Contract often used in this state; 
for example, both provided the seller with 
the same alternative remedies in the event 
of a breach by buyer: 1) seller could, after 
giving five days written notice, declare the 
interest of buyer to be forfeited and take 
possession of the premises; 2) seller could 
sue for all delinquent installments; or 3) 
seller could treat the contract as a note and 
mortgage and proceed to foreclose accord-
ing to statutory provisions and have the 
property sold. 
Upon obtaining FCC approval of the 
transfer of the license to Seagull in Decem-
ber, 1974, Seagull paid the required down 
payments of $5,000 for the real property 
and $74,000 for the personal property and 
license. No further payments were made 
by Seagull under the installment payment 
provisions of the contracts. 
Because of Seagull's default under the 
agreements, Wilkinson notified Seagull on 
September 4, 1975 that Seagull's interest 
would be forfeited if it failed to bring all 
payments current within five days. Seagull 
tendered no payments, but Wilkinson took 
no further action regarding the forfeiture. 
On May 26, 1976, Wilkinson entered into 
an installment sale contract with plaintiff 
Tim Themy (hereafter Themy) for the sale 
of the radio station, including all real and 
personal property and the license. Wilkin-
son also assigned to Themy his interest in 
the purchase agreements with Seagull. 
On March 8, 1977, after obtaining FCC 
approval, Seagull transferred its interest in 
the license and the broadcasting equipment 
to defendant Shirley K. Watson, dba Mur-
ray Broadcasting Company. Thereafter, 
with FCC approval, Watson assigned her 
interest to defendant Murray Broadcasting 
Company, Inc. (hereafter MBC). 
Plaintiff's original complaint was filed in 
October, 1976. In July, 1977, plaintiff filed 
an amended complaint, naming, in addition 
to the above defendants, United Bank and 
Zions First National Bank; the interests of 
the banks, however, are not in issue on 
appeal. The amended complaint asked the 
court to adjudge the interests of defendants 
Seagull, Watson, United Bank, and MBC in 
the real property to be forfeited; alterna-
tively, it requested judgment for $245,000, 
the amount owing on the contract concern-
ing the real property, and judgment fore-
closing the agreement as a mortgage ac-
cording to the contract terms. Regarding 
the contract to sell the personal property 
and the license, the amended complaint con-
tained four alternative prayers for relief: 
1) judgment declaring the license and prop-
erty to be forfeited as per the contract 
terms; 2) judgment for $176,000, the 
amount owing on the contract, and judg-
ment foreclosing the agreement as a mort-
gage; 3) judgment declaring plaintiffs in-
terests to be secured according to the UCC, 
and allowing a sale of the collateral under 
the secured transactions provisions of the 
UCC; 4) judgment setting aside the con-
veyance by Seagull to Watson as fraudu-
lent, and appointing a receiver to protect 
the property involved in the litigation. 
After reviewing the record, including af-
fidavits and the depositions of Themy, Wat-
son and an officer of Seagull, the district 
court heard arguments of counsel and 
granted Themy's motion for summary judg-
ment. The judgment declared the interests 
of Seagull, Watson, United Bank and MBC 
in the real property, the personal property 
and the FCC license to be forfeited accord-
ing to the terms of the agreements between 
Wilkinson and Seagull. The court named 
Themy as the owner of all interests forfeit-
ed by virtue of Wilkinson's assignment to 
Themy on May 26, 1976. 
[1] As usual in reviewing a case dis-
posed of in the district court by summary 
judgment, we consider the evidence in the 
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light most favorable to the losing party,1 
and affirm only where it appears there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material issues of 
fact, or where, even according to the facts 
as contended by the losing party, the mov-
ing party is entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law.2 
[2,3] We note preliminarily that de-
fendants c> ;;••: c:. :-:t the- validity ^r en-
forceability of the agreements between Wil-
kinson and Seagull, and this Court will up-
hold the forfeiture provisions of such con-
tracts, unless amounts retained as liquidat-
ed damages are so great as to be uncon-
scionable, or in the nature of a penalty.3 
Nor do defendants Watson and MBC con-
tend their interests are insulated from the 
forfeiture provisions by Seagull's assign-
ment of its interests under the agreements. 
As assignees from the purchaser, Watson 
and MBC obtained only the interests held 
by Seagull, and clearly hold those interests 
subject to the original seller's rights re-
tained by Wilkinson and later assigned to 
Themy.4 
Defendants allege the existence of dis-
puted facts concerning Themy's rights as 
the successor to Wilkinson's interest in the 
two purchase agreements which prevent 
summary judgment below. To support this 
claim, defendants assert Wilkinson assigned 
his interest in the agreements to Zions 
Bank prior to the assignment to Themy, 
and thus Wilkinson had no assignable inter-
est to convey to Themy. Defendants also 
assert Wilkinson retained no enforceable 
forfeiture remedies under the contracts as 
they related to the FCC license, after the 
FCC approved the transfer of the license to 
Seagull. We address this issue at a later 
point herein. 
1. Whitman v. W. T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 
395 P.2d 918 (1964). 
2. Utah Ri:!e; cf Civ:! Procedure, 56(c); Ruffi-
nengo v. Miller, Utah, 579 P.2d 342 (1978); 
Durham v. Margetts, Utah, 571 P.2d 1332 
(1977). 
3. Johnson v. Carman, Utah, 572 P.2d 371 
(1977) and cases cited therein. 
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[4] No material factual issue exists re-
garding Themy's right to bring this action 
as successor to Wilkinson's interests. The 
undisputed evidence from Themy's deposi-
tion and accompanying exhibits showed 
Wilkinson assigned all his interests in both 
agreements to Themy. Wilkinson's prior 
assignment to Zions Bank affected only his 
interest in the agreement concerning the 
real estate, and was simply an assignment 
for security which accompanied a Trust 
Deed in favor of the bank. Although the 
interests which Wilkinson assigned to The-
my in the real estate agreement were in-
deed subject to the security interest of Zi-
ons Bank, this in no way divested Wilkinson 
of all interest in the agreement, any more 
than a homeowner is divested of his owner-
ship rights by mortgaging his property.5 
[5] Defendants next allege a factual is-
sue exists regarding Themy's compliance 
with the remedial provisions of the agree-
ments. The agreements provide: 
DEFAULT OF BUYER. In the event of 
a failure to comply with the terms hereof 
by the Buyer, or upon failure oi the Buy-
er to make any payment or payments 
when the same shall become due, or with-
in 90 days or after, the Seller, at his 
option shall have the following alterna-
tive remedies: 
A. Seller shall have the right upon 
failure of the Buyer to remedy the de-
fault within five days after written no-
tice, to be released from all obligations in 
law and in equity to convey said property, 
and all payments which have been made 
theretofore on this contract by the Buyer 
shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidat-
ed damages for the non-performance of 
the contract . 
4. Pearce v. Shurtz, 2 Utah 2d 124, 270 P.2d 442 
(1954); 77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser, 
$ 3S9. 
5. Cf. Murray First Thrift and Loan Co. v. Ste-
venson, Utah, 534 P.2d 909 (1975). (Vendors 
could not refuse to convey title to assignee of 
purchaser because assignment from purchaser 
to assignee was made without vendors' approv-
al as required by real estate contract, since 
assignment was given merely as security for 
loan.) 
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It is undisputed that none of defendants 
has made any payments under the contract 
subsequent to the initial down payments. 
In September, 1975, Wilkinson notified Sea-
gull of its default, and of Wilkinson's intent 
to declare a forfeiture unless the default 
was remedied within five days. However, 
Wilkinson took no further action, and as-
signed his interests to Themy in May, 1976. 
Defendants allege that Wilkinson's right to 
declare a forfeiture was therefore waived; 
but regardless of that possibility, defend-
ants were properly notified by Themy in 
September, 1977. The notice of default was 
delivered to Jay Gardner, a \ice president 
of Seagull and manager of the radio station 
operated by MBC. The notice informed 
Seagull of Themy's election to declare a 
forfeiture under the agreements unless the 
delinquent payments were made current 
within five days, and the amount necessary 
to remedy the default was specified. No 
payments were made in response to this 
notice, nor have any payments been made 
at any time since 1974. 
[6] Although defendants make several 
objections to the validity of the notice given 
by Themy, they raise these claims for the 
first time before us, and we therefore de-
cline to review them.6 
[7] Defendants also contend the district 
court improperly decreed a forfeiture of the 
$79,000 down payment made by Seagull to 
Wilkinson, because the forfeiture of so 
large a sum is an unconscionable penalty. 
The simple response to this allegation is 
that the district court merely declared de-
r
 nr]o"[c' intny*''5f5 i* *H^ j_>roT"><'i,"t" f^^c '^1' r\ 
judgment does not address the matter of 
the down payment made to Wilkinson. 
Moreover, plaintiff's amended complaint re-
quests no determination by the court with 
respect to the down payment to Wilkinson, 
and defendants did not raise that issue in 
their responsive pleadings nor did they 
.6. Hanover Limited v. Fields, Utah, 568 P 2d 751 
(1977) 
7. Johnson v. Carman, supra note 3 and cases 
cited therein. 
make any attempt before the district court 
to have any portion of the down payment 
returned. Defendants' reliance on cases 
which hold that a forfeiture of substantial 
sums paid under a contract, ostensibly as 
liquidated damages, may be unconsciona-
ble,7 is therefore misplaced. In those cases, 
the issue of unconscionability was properly 
raised by the purchaser either by a suit to 
recover sums paid or by an affirmative de-
fense to the seller's action to declare a 
forfeiture. Neither course has been pur-
sued by defendants in this case, and the 
issue is not properly before us. 
[8] We turn now to the question of 
whether the district court had power to 
adjudicate this controversy as it relates to 
the FCC license. The FCC has been em-
powered by Congress, in the public interest, 
with exclusive jurisdiction over radio broad-
casting.8 Section 310(d) of the Federal 
Communications Act provides as follows: 
"No construction permit or station 
license, of any rights thereunder, shall be 
transferred, assigned, or disposed of in 
any manner, voluntarily or involuntarily, 
directly or indirectly, or by transfer of 
control of any corporation holding such 
permit or license, to any person except 
upon application to the Commission and 
upon finding by the Commission that the 
public interest, convenience, and necessity 
will be served thereby." 
Defendants contend that in view of the 
above section, the district court was with-
out power to adjudge that "the interests of 
defendants Seagull Enterprises, Inc., Shir-
ley K. Watson, United Bank and Murray 
r„, i, s _ r „ f v • * ^ FCr 
i.cv.^ <- uesciitxu in ar i :.- -
 o _ c: t~e 
Purchase Agreement for sa'e of the broad-
casting equipment and license dated June 
26, 1974 are forfeited by virtue of the de-
fault of the buyer thereunder." We disa-
gree. The district court merely determined 
the respective rights of the parties under a 
private agreement, and the fact that the 
8. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq; Radio Station 
WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 65 S.Ct. 
1475, 89 LEd. 2092 (1945). 
THEMY v. SEAGULL ENTERPRISES, INC. 
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Utah 531 
agreement concerns a radio station does not 
divest the court of jurisdiction.9 
In Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 
326 U S. 120, 65 S.Ct. 1475, S9 L.Ed. 2092 
(1945), an insurance society (lessor) leased a 
radio station to Radio Station WOW, Inc. 
(lessee) and applied to the FCC for a trans-
fer of the license to the lessee. At the same 
time, a member of the lessor sued in a 
Nebraska state court to have the lease set 
aside for fraud. While this suit was pend-
ing the FCC consented to the assignment of 
the license to the lessee, and the lessor 
transferred it and the station properties to 
the lessee. The Nebraska Supreme Court 
thereafter set aside the lease on the 
grounds of fraud, and directed that "the 
license to operate the station be returned 
and that lessee be directed to do all things 
necessary for that purpose; that generally 
everything be done to restore the parties to 
their original position prior to entering into 
the lease . " The U. S. Supreme 
Court held that the Nebraska Supreme 
Court "went outside its bounds when it 
ordered the parties 'to do all things neces-
sary' to secure a return of the license," I0 
because the order required the lessor to ask 
the FCC for a retransfer of the license to it 
and required the lessee not to oppose the 
transfer. The court explained that the Ne-
braska order, by hampering the freedom of 
the lessor not to continue in broadcasting 
and preventing the lessee from opposing 
the revocation of its license, imposed re-
strictions not only upon private rights of 
the parties, but also upon the licencing sys-
tem which Congress had established 
But the court emphasized the power of a 
state court to adjudicate issues involving 
FCC licenses as long as the state court does 
not affirmatively interfere with the author-
ity of the FCC to authorize the transfer, 
assignment or other disposition of licenses* 
We have no doubt of the power 
of the Nebraska court to adjudicate, and 
conclusively, the claim of fraud in the 
transfer of the station by the Society to 
9. Stenger \ Stenger Broadcasting Corporation, 
28 F.Supp 407 (D C Pa 1939), Regents of Urn-
\ersit\ System of Georgia v Carroll, 338 U S 
586. 70 S Ct 370, 94 L Ed. 363 (1950) 
WOW and upon finding fraud to direct a 
reconveyance of the lease to the Society. 
And this, even though the property con-
sists of licensed facilities and the Society 
chooses not to apply for retransfer of the 
radio license to it, or the Commission, 
upon such application, refuses the re-
transfer. The result may well be the 
termination of a broadcasting station. 
The Communications Act does not explic-
itly deal with this problem, and we find 
nothing in its interstices that dislodges 
the power of the States to deal with 
fraud merely because licensed facilities 
are involved. The "public interest" with 
which the Commission is charged is that 
involved in granting licenses. Safeguard-
ing of that interest can hardly imply that 
the interest of States in enforcing their 
laws against fraud have been nullified 
insofar as licensed facilities may be the 
instruments of fraud. [326 U.S. at 131-2, 
65 S.Ct. at 14S1.] 
The above view was reaffirmed by the 
Supreme Court in Regents of the Universi-
ty System of Georgia v. Carroll, 338 U.S. 
586, 70 S.Ct. 370, 94 L.Ed. 363 (1950), which 
involved proceedings for the renewal of a 
radio license. The FCC ruled that, unless a 
contract between the licensee and a broad-
casting company for the purchase of the 
latter's stock were invalidated, the license 
would not be renewed. After the licensee 
accordingly repudiated the contract, the 
broadcasting company sued in the state 
courts for an accounting, obtaining a judg-
ment in its favor The Supreme Court af-
firmed, stating: 
the [FCC] could make a choice 
only within the scope of its licensing pow-
er, i. e., to grant or deny the license on 
the basis of the situation of the applicant. 
It could insist that the applicant change 
its situation before it granted a license, 
but it could not act as a bankruptcy court 
to change that situation for the applicant. 
. . . The [FCC] has said frequently 
10. 326 U.S. at 130, 65 S.Ct at 1481 
532 Utah 595 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
that controversies as to rights between 
licensees and others are outside the ambit 
of its powers. We do not read the Com-
munications Act to give authority to the 
[FCC] to determine the validity of con-
tracts between licensees and others. [338 
U.S. at 602, 70 S.Ct. at 378.] 
The case at hand is not one in which a 
state court has impinged upon the jurisdic-
tion of the FCC. The judgment simply 
enforces the terms of the agreements pro-
viding for forfeiture upon default by the 
purchaser, and declares the owner of the 
interests in the radio station and the license 
to be Themy. It does not require the par-
ties to take any specific action regarding a 
re transfer of the license, as in Radio Station 
WOW, Inc. Significantly, the judgment did 
not grant Themy's requested relief for "a 
mandatory injunction requiring 
defendants to assist plaintiff in obtaining 
transfer of the FCC license into plaintiffs 
name." The judgment of the court is not 
beyond its authority, under the law as out-
lined above.11 
[9] Finally, we turn to defendants' alle-
gation of error in the district court's order 
appointing a receiver for the interests for-
feited under the agreements. Rule 66, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
11. See also In Re Assignment of License of 
Station WMCA, 10 FCC 241, Big League 
Broadcasting Co, Inc \ Shedd-Agard Broad-
(a) Grounds for Appointment. A re-
ceiver may be appointed by the court in 
which an action is pending or has passed 
to judgment: 
* * * * * * 
(4) After judgment, to dispose of the 
property according to the judgment, or to 
preserve it during the pendency of an 
appeal, or in proceedings in aid of execu-
tion when an execution has been returned 
unsatisfied, or when the judgment debtor 
refuses to apply his property in satisfac-
tion of the judgment. [Emphasis added.] 
The appointment of the receiver in this case 
was clearly proper under the rules, Themy's 
motion for appointment having been made 
after defendants filed their notice of ap-
peal. We find no error on the part of the 
district court. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS, HALL 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
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J., entered summary judgment for transferee 
and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, 
Zimmerman, C.J., held that: (1) statute in-
validating restrictions on shares, unless leg-
end appeared on certificate, was limited to 
restrictions imposed by corporation and did 
not extend to restriction agreed upon by 
shareholders, and (2) fact issue existed as to 
whether shareholders had waived first refus-
al rights. 
Reversed and remanded. 
, INC., a Utah corporation dba Bud-
lent-A-Car of Salt Lake; Paul Tay-
individually; and Michael Taylor, 
idually, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
B. KOROULIS, and Montana 
id Produce Co., Inc., a Utah corpo-
n, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 930506. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 16, 1994. 
Shearing Denied Feb. 8, 1995. 
uer and shareholders brought suit 
one shareholder and putative trans-
illeging breach of shareholder agree-
nder which transferring shareholder 
luired to first offer shares to corpora-
other shareholders. The District 
Salt Lake County, Richard H. Moffat, 
1. Appeal and Error c=>S63 
In renewing entitlement to summary 
judgment, Supreme Court determines only 
whether trial court erred in applying govern-
ing law and whether trial court correctly held 
there were no disputed issues as to material 
fact. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c). 
2. Statutes 0184, 217.4 
Only when there is ambiguity in stat-
ute's plain language do courts need to seek 
guidance from legislative history and rele-
vant policy considerations. 
3. Corporations 0=113 
Statute providing that restriction on 
transfer of security "imposed" by issuer was 
ineffective against person without actual 
knowledge, unless restriction was conspicu-
ously noted on security, did not apply to bar 
claim by sharehuidei ? that they had right to 
acquire stock pledged by another sharehold-
er; restriction had been agreed upon by 
shareholders, rather than being imposed by 
corporatiun through charter, bylaws or cor-
porate resolution. U.C.A.1953, 70A-S-204. 
4. Judgment olS5.3(l) 
Assuming that statute invalidating re-
strictions on shares imposed by issuer, in 
absence of restrictive legend on certificate or 
actual knowledge on part of holder, applied 
also to ivsti^t^i:- imposed by ^grc.mcr.t 
among shareholders buyer of securities 
which did not have legend was nonetheless 
not entitled to summary judgment: buyer 
could still be bound by restrictions if it had 
actual knowledge of them, and affidavit by 
representative stating that buyer had not 
been informed of restriction by personnel of 
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seller did not foreclose possibility that actual 
knowledge had been acquired from some oth-
er source. U.C.A.1953, 70A-S-204; Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 56(e). 
5. Appeal and Error OS54(l), S56(l) 
Grant of summary judgment may be 
affirmed on any ground, even one not relied 
on by tri?l court. 
6. Estoppel 052.10(2) 
Waiver requires (1) existing right, bene-
fit or advantage, (2) knowledge of its exis-
tence, and (3) intention to relinquish right. 
7. Judgment 0185.3U) 
Material issues of fact, precluding sum-
mary judgment, existed as to whether share-
holders had waived right to insist upon hav-
ing opportunity to match offer before any 
shareholder could transfer shares; share-
holder gave affidavit that he had been re-
quested to consent to pledge of shares and 
had refused to do so, and that he had not 
been given advance notice of transfer of 
shares or opportunity to meet offer, as pro-
vided for under shareholder's agreement. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(e). 
John W. Call, Craig T. Vincent, Curtis C* 
Xes&et, Salt Lake City, for Montana Brand' 
Produce Co. -rl 
Donald J. Winder, Kathy A.F. Davis, Rob-
ert D. Tingey, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs. 
lurk W. Bennett. John C. Green. Kim M. 
Luhn. Salt Lake City, for Korouhs. 
1. Korou'^ aid the Ta\lnrs were the SOIL stock-
holdcis in K ^ T 
2. The Stockholders Agreement proudes as fol-
low* 
1 Resru ' oils Duni^ Lifetime of Stockhold-
er No SiOwUioldc* shaM trai^fei CT cUiiT»h • 
I is ihaics ot capual stock ot the Corporation 
uhether piescntlv owned oi to be acquired, to 
j"I ,VIM l i ( i v.Oip ration wrthoi ! c con 
sent of the other Stockholders unless the Stock-
l l O i U C l >uv -> .
 c i u IMK\. iiiw u a i i b i w l Ui w . J v a i i i 
biance (hereinafter referred to as the Transferor) 
shall ha\e hist mad*, the olfer to sell, hereinattci 
described and sMch offer shall not have been 
accepted 
U) Ojfci b\ T)ansie)0) The offer shall be 
gnen to the Corporation and to the other 
Stockholders and shall consist of an offu to 
sell all the shdies. of capital slock of the Coipo-
lation owned b\ the Transferor to which offu 
shall be attached a statement of intention to 
-U 
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiffs K & T, Inc., and Paul and Mi-" 
chael Taylor appeal from the district court's^ 
grant of nummary ji dement in favor of de— 
*:- ' t M'v.utia Bi^id Pi.» iu e Co. ^ \ 
reverse and remand. ^ 
"Before we recite the facts, we note that in-
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we^ 
\iew the facts and all reasonable inferences^ 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable^ 
to the nonmoung pam." Htggins v. Salt: 
Lake County. S55 P-d 231. 233 (Utah 1993)J 
"We state the facts m this case accordingly." \ 
K & T ib a closely held Utah corporation! 
which owns and operates a rental-car fraiir* 
chise along the Wasatch Front. On June 30,^  
1981, K & T, the Taylors, and George Ko-'l 
rouhs l entered into an agreement ("Stock-1 
holders' Agreement") governing any transfer^ 
or encumbrance of K & T stock. To present 
outsiders from gaining a right to share in thej 
management of K & T. the stockholders"1 
agreed to restrict the transfer or encum-* 
brance of K & T stock This restriction took I 
the form of a preemptive right on the part of-* 
K & T and its stockholders to purchase anyj| 
K &. T stock that a stockholder intended to J 
transfer or encumber* 
Agi eement specifically 
The Stockholders'? 
Drovided that allfj 
tra^s^e-- o- . - C u ^ c tUe c^c ma> be, ard> 
the number of shares of cap'ta! stock in\olvcd,1 
which shah be all ot his shaies * ^ 
(h) A <e~' - e of tile 0,'ei Within thirty1 
(30) da\s after receipt of such offer the Corpo< 
tauon ma\, at Us option, elect to purchase all^ 
but not !esN
 tnan uli, of tr.e ^ha.es ot stocky 
owned b\ the Transleror If the offer is ngy 
nccentcd b\ the Cor^onnon witrVn that timc,< 
the othei Stockholders ma\, within forty-fiv^ 
option, purchase on a pro-rata basis all of sarOy 
Auics uf capual MO»A In the c\ent any on* 
or moic of the indn di rl Stockholders ^\M 
purchase all of the shares he is entitled**^ 
purchase, such shares shall be available to lift 
iemainmg Stockholders on a pro-rata basils 
within ten (10) da>s additional alter such avajL 
uoiht\ The acceptance b\ an\ such Oitcrg 
shall be in writing 
K & T, INC. 
Cite as 888 P.2d 
certificates were to be surrendered to 
T and endorsed with a restrictive en-
ment.3 Nevertheless, no such endorse-
was ever placed upon Koroulis' stock 
tcates. 
August 31,1990, Bountiful Motor Sales, 
"BMS"), a corporation owned by Ko-
, entered into a financing agreement 
Dealership Loan") with First Security 
("FSB"). At approximately the same 
FSB made a number of personal loans 
>roulis. BMS eventually defaulted on 
ealership Loan, and Koroulis defaulted 
3 personal obligations. After the de-
, Koroulis, BMS. and FSB entered into 
ies of forbearance, eross-eollateraliza-
md loan agreements ("the Forbearance 
ments").4 Pursuant to these agree-
, Koroulis and BMS provided FSB with 
onal collateral for the Dealership Loan, 
extended additional credit to BMS and 
lis, all of the loans were cross-defaulted 
Toss-collateralized, and certain other 
and conditions were imposed on the 
part of the additional collateral provid-
Koroulis and BMS to FSB under the 
arance Agreements, Koroulis executed 
reement under which he pledged to 
his shares of K & T stock ("Pledge 
ment"). Richard H. Pope, a vice presi-
of FSB. reviewed the Stockholders' 
ment and determined that the consent 
K & T stockholders was necessary for 
1 pledge of Koroulis' stock.: Pope ch-
attorneys for FSB to prepare a con-
greement for lvvicw and e\e:ut:or. by 
Taylor, then vice president of K & T 
the execution of the Pledge Agreement 
roulis. Pope met with Paul Taylor on 
1 occasions in an attempt to obtain his 
t to the pledge. Paul Taylor refused 
i the first consent agi-eement, a five-
ocument prepared by FSB's attorneys. 
agraph 15 of the Stockholders' Agreement 
des for the endorsement of the following 
ction upon the stock certificates. 
' transfer of the shares of stock represented 
this certificate is restricted under the tei ms 
*n Agreement dated June 30. 19S1, a cop\ 
vhich is on file in the office of the Corpora-
i. subject to amendments. 
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Pope then directed attorneys for FSB to 
draft a "simpler" consent agreement, which 
Paul Taylor also refused to sign. Neither K 
& T nor the Taylors ever consented to the 
pledge of K & T stock by Koroulis to FSB. 
BMS and Koroulis eventually defaulted on 
their obligations to FSB under the Forbear-
ance Agreements. Sometime after the de-
fault, Koroulis and BMS contacted Montana 
Brand to request that Montana Brand pur-
chase FSB's interest in the Koroulis and 
BMS loans. After Montana Brand tentative-
ly agreed to such an arrangement, FSB 
drafted an agreement by which FSB would 
sell its interest in the Koroulis and BMS 
loans, along with the collateral securing those 
loans, to Montana Brand ("Loan Sale Agree-
ment"). 
At the time the Loan Sale Agreement was 
executed, Robert G. Maxfield. secretary of 
Montana Brand, reviewed FSB's loan file. 
Although the file did contain a copy of the 
Pledge Agreement. Maxfield asserted in an 
affidavit that the file did not contain a copy 
of either the proposed consent agreements or 
the Stockholders' Agreement. Discovery 
conducted after the trial court dismissed 
FSB from the case reveals, however, that the 
Stockholders' Agreement and the proposed 
consent agreements were in the file. Max-
field also asserted via affidavit that 4*[n]either 
[he] nor, to the best of [hi>] knowledge, 
anyone at Montana Brand was informed of 
the existence of the Consent Agreement or 
the Stockholders' Agreement ly pcr^;:nJ. 
from First Security [Bank] M 
Sometime arcur.d May 2S, lt??2, M.:::«r.M 
Brand sent Paul Taylor a letter claiming that 
Koroulis and BMS had defaulted on their 
loan obligations and that Montana Brand was 
therefore the owner of Koroulis stock under 
the terms of the Pledge Agreement. In his 
affidavit, Paul Taylor averred that this letter 
was the "first information [he recened] that 
4. The first agreement was dated March 25, 1991, 
a second was dated September 17 1991 and a 
third was dated Decembet 2, 1991. 
5. Each of the indiudual forbearance agiecments 
prou'ded. as a condition of foiboaiar.ct. that 
Koroulis deh\er a consent agreement, executed 
bv the stockholders of K. & T. consenting to the 
pledge. 
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the Pledge Agreement had been executed, or 
that Montana Brand claimed an interest in 
[Koroulis'] shares." In response to the let-
ter, Paul Taylor informed Montana Brand 
that K & T and the Taylors were entitled to 
purchase the stock for an amount set forth in 
the Stockholders' Agreement. When Mon-
tana Brand declined the request, K & T and 
the Taylors brought this action against Ko-
roulis and Montana Brand in Utah's Third 
Judicial District Court.6 
On April 30, 1992, K & T and the Taylors 
moved for summary judgment, asking the 
district court to declare that Koroulis had 
breached the Stockholders' Agreement and 
that K & T and the Taylors were entitled to 
purchase Koroulis' stock as set forth in the 
Stockholders' Agreement. In response, 
Montana Brand filed a cross-motion for sum-
mary judgment. In its cross-motion, Mon-
tana Brand asserted that (i) section 70A-&-
204 of the Code7 rendered the restriction on 
transfer contained in the Stockholders' 
Agreement ineffective because the restriction 
was never endorsed on the stock certificates 
and Montana Brand took the stock without 
actual knowledge of the restriction; and (ii) 
the Taylors and K & T waived the right to 
enforce the restriction. In response to Mon-
tana Brand's cross-motion for summary judg-
ment, K & T and the Taylors argued that 
section 70A-8-204 applied only to restric-
6. On August 17, 1992, Montana Brand filed a 
tVi»rr].n;?r»\ cornr>'?,r>r a^iir^* FSB allesrnn faaud 
and misrepresentation in connection with the 
Loan Sale Agreement Montana Brand claimed 
tha: FSB had fa VJ ^ d.>c!o.e that the t :a-fa : 
of K <& T stock was restricted bv the Stockhold-
ers Agreement FSB mo\ed to dismiss, claim-
ing that Montana Biand had failed to perform 
due diligence prior to entering into the Loan Sale 
Agreement with FSB The district court agreed, 
stating: 
Montana Brand[] was perfectly free to talk to 
the btockholdeis and just as able to do bo Jb 
[FSB] had been Wheic there weie no inhibi-
tions placed in the path of Montana Brandf ] to 
do any investigation it wished in icgard to the 
transaction and it failed to make such inquin 
it cannot now be heard to complain 
7. Section 70A-S-204 pro\ides in relc\ant part as 
follow s 
A reduction on tiansfer of a secuntv imposed 
bv the issuer, c\en though otherwise lawful, is 
tions "imposed by the issuer" of the securi-
ties. Because the restriclion at issue here' 
was agreed to by all of the stockholders 
rather than imposed by K & T, the effective? 
ness of the restriction should be measured by 
reference to section 70A-8-302 of the Code$ 
rather than to section 70A-8-204. ^ 
At a hearing on June 21, 1993, the district 
court granted Montana Brand's cross-motion 
for summary judgment. In so doing, it con-
cluded as a matter of law that section 70A-8i 
204 was applicable "[bjecause the Stockhold-
ers['] Agreement is actually between K & T-
and the three stockholders of K & T, [and]; 
the restriction on transfer . . . was imposed" 
by the issuer of the stock." Furthermore, 
relying on the Maxiield affidavit, the district, 
court concluded that Montana Brand took" 
the stock without actual knowledge of any 
restriction on the transfer of the stock. K & 
T and the Taylors appeal, claiming that (i) 
the trial court erred when it relied on section' 
70A-8-204 rather than on section 70A-S-302 
to measure the effect of the restriction on 
transfer contained in the Stockholders'^  
Agreement, and (ii) even if section 70A-8-' 
204 is applicable, genuine issues of material 
fact exist which preclude summai\ judgment 
[1] We first state the applicable standard 
of renew. Summary judgment is appropri-j 
ate only when no genuine issues of material 
fact exist and the moving party is entitled to 
ineffective against any person without actual; 
knowledge of '* r 1 ' ^ '*** 
(1) the secunt\ is certificated and the restrict 
uon is noted conspicuous!) on the instru% 
r e n t r 
Utah Code Ann § 70A-3-204 , ',*? 
8. Section 70A-8-302 prouder in rele\ant part ajn 
(\) A bona fide puicha<er" u» a pu^chabCft 
for \?!ue in good faith and without notice of' 
an\ adverse claim ^ 
(a) who takes deliver} of a cciuficated SCCIK 
4it\ in bearer toim oi in registered fonfy£ 
issued or indoised to him oi in blank; >tS 
(2) Adverse claim ' includes a claim thatjfcj 
transfer was or would be wrongful or that fl£ 
particular adverse person is the owner of 0§j 
has an interest in the sccurit\ ' J^£ 
(3) \ bona fide purchaser in addition to aCg 
quiring the rights of a purchase! under Scctiojk 
70A-S-301, also acquires his interest in$M 
sccuiit\ fice of an\ adveise claim. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-S-302 
K & T, INC. 
Cite as 888 P 2d 
ent as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ P. 
Higgvis, 855 P2d at 235 Because 
ment to summary judgment is a ques-
f law, we accord no deference to the 
•ouit's resolution of the legal issues 
ited Higgins, S55 P2d at 235, Fenee 
e, 784 P 2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) "We 
line only whethei the trial court erred 
dying the governing law and whether 
al court conectly held that there were 
puted issues of material factM Fervee 
2d at 151 (citing Bushnell Real Estate, 
Xiehoa 672 P2d 746, 749 (Utah 
Bonen v Rnerton City, 656 P 2d 434, 
;tah 1982)). 
first question is whether the district 
erred when it held that the transfei 
tion contained in the Stockholders' 
ment is an issuer-imposed restriction 
s critical because section 70A-8-204 
es that onl} 4 [a] lestuction on tiansfei 
2cunt\ imposed by the issuer" is mef-
» against any person without actual 
sdge unless the restriction is conspicu-
noted on the secunty (Emphasis add-
[f the restriction at issue was not "im-
by K & T but b} the stockholder, 
I 70A-8-204 does not apply 
When faced with a question of statu-
onstruction, we look first to the plain 
ige of the statute State i Lai sen, S65 
1355, 1357 (Utah 1993), Schuiiz i 
ofX Am Inc 814 P2d 1108 1112 
1991\ Bnnkerkoft v Foisyth 779 
65, b6b (Utah 1989;, see also Boiuauu 
»a,\ 7SS P2d 497 500 'Utah 19S9) 
Liidiu; ( Unambiguous langui*&e . 4 [">] 
3
 may not be interpreted to conn adict 
in meaning ") In construing a statute 
ume that "each teim in the statute was 
dvisedly thus the statuton woids aie 
tei alh unless such a I eading is um ea-
y confused or mopeiable ' Saiage In 
Inc i Utah State Ta* Commn 811 
ih Code Ann § 70A-8-201 
tah Code Ann § 70A-l-201(25)(b) 
for instance K i Ts boa-d of duectors 
^ t d and the stockholders of K 6. T dp 
d^ a b\la\v which mandated that no K ^ T 
holder eouid sell his K <L T stock unless 
>. KOROULIS Utah 627 
623 (Ltah 1994) 
P2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991) "Onh when we 
find ambiguity in the statute's plain language 
need we seek guidance fiom the legislate e 
history and rele\ ant policy considerations " 
World Peace M oi e ment of Am i Xeuspopn 
Agency Coip 879 P 2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994), 
tee also SchuHz, 814 P2d at 1112 ('We fust 
look to the statute's plain language Only if 
w*e find some ambiguity need we look fur-
ther."), Bnnkerkoft, 779 P.2d at m (holding 
that if "statutory language is plain and unam-
biguous, this Couit will not look be\ond the 
same to drune legislate e intent') 
[3] While the Code defines the temis "is-
suer" 9 and "know ledge," lu it does not define 
the teim 'imposed ' Common u>age of the 
word, howe\er, is quite clear from othei 
sources Accoidmg to Webstei's, to impose 
is ul To enact or appl} as compulson 
2 To apply oi make pi e\ ail b\ oi as if b\ 
authonty 3 To obtrude oi foice (eg 
oneself) upon anothei or othei s ' Web^tc,\ 
II Nen Rivei'side Unneisity Dutioncny 614 
(1984) These definition* contemplate a situ-
ation wheie one is foiced to comnh with the 
dnecti\e of anothei In the context of the 
piesent case, the reduction on tiansfei 
would be l^uei-imposed if it weie contained 
i n K & T s chaitei or b\laws oi m a coipo-
late l evolution If such weie the case the 
stockholdeis of K & T would ha\e no cnoice 
but to comply with tne teims ot the lestiic 
tion l l 
In the case at hand, howe\ei each of the 
stOCkliOldfcJls VolunUili l^ a g l c c u tD LOlttui i c 
^trct^nn- on the I light to t1 m-fpi then 
^ a i . ?K i T T'e n*i* f ct t W K ^ T 
is a pait\ to the agieement does not change 
its \oluntaiv natuie Absent the Stockhold-
eis Agieement K & T would be poweiless 
to contiol the disposition ot am oi the shaie^ 
oi k i T stock Accuidihgn, we tuncldue 
that the lestuction at issue heie was not 
*mposed' b\ K &. T S'e aho I C C % fc-
thosc shares were fust offcicd to the other stock 
holders that restriction would be imposed b\ the 
coipoiation and Uuu'd be bindm_ c\cn on tl osc 
stockholdcis that \otcd against t ic b\'a\\ Tu-
Vu Dn\L-In C0/7; 1 Ashkiis 61 Cal 2d 283 3S 
CalRp'i US 348-SO 391 P 2d &2J> 825-30 
(1964) The efficac\ of such 1 lestuction as 
against a thud part\ would be measured b\ 
section 70A-8-204 
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204 cmt. 6 (indicating that section 8-204 does 
not apply to "private agreements between 
stockholders containing restrictive covenants 
as to the sale of the security"). 
Montana Brand makes much of the first 
sentence of the Stockholders' Agreement, 
which states that it is an agreement "by and 
between George B. Koroulis, Paul F. Taylor, 
and P. Michael Taylor, hereinafter referred 
to as 4Stockholders[,]' . . . individually, and K 
& T Corporation—Budget-Rent-A-Car, a 
Utah Corporation, hereinafter referred to as 
'Corporation.'" According to Montana 
Brand, this language indicates that the 
Stockholders' Agreement "was not merely 
among the stockholders of K & T but was 
actually an agreement between the stock-
holders of K & T on the one side and K & T, 
the issuer, on the other side." We think that 
Montana Brand's interpretation of this intro-
ductory language is untenable. This lan-
guage simply indicates that there are four 
parties to the Stockholders' Agreement, 
three individual stockholders and K & T. 
Koroulis and the Taylors are listed together 
for convenience, because they are each indi-
viduals rather than corporate entities, rather 
than to indicate that they are on one side of 
the agreement and K & T is on the other. 
[4] We note that even if we were to 
conclude that section 70A-S-204 were appli-
cable, it would still be necessary to remand 
because Montana Brand failed to meet its 
affirmative burden, as the party moving for 
summary judgment, of establishing that 
there were no disputed material issues of 
fact. See Lamb > P M 1 
Corp., S69 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993) ("The 
party moving for summary judgment must 
establish a right to judgment based on the 
applicable law as applied to an undisputed 
material issue of fact."). Section 70A-8-204 
provides that "[a] restriction on transfer of a 
security imposed by the issuer" L> ineffective 
against any person without actual knowledge 
unless the restriction is conspicuously noted 
on the security. Thus, to prevail undei sec-
tion 70A-S-204, Montana Brand must show 
that there are no disputed material issues of 
fact regarding its lack of actual knowledge. 
Unless it does so. the paity opposing the 
motion is under no obligation to demonstrate 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id? 
928; Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e); cf. Thayne v. 5$ 
eficial Utak Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Ut£p 
1994). 
Here, Montana Brand presented a careftj^ 
ly tailored affidavit in which Maxfield testfL 
fied that "[n]either [he] nor, to the bes^oflf 
[his] knowledge, anyone at Montana Bran^l 
was informed of the existence of the Consent! 
Agreement or the Stockholders' Agreement 
by personnel from First Security [Bankf$% 
(Emphasis added.) Montana Brand also s u ^ 
mitted an admission on the part of Koroulj&l 
that he had never informed Montana Brand/1 
about the restriction. These two pieces^ ojfl 
evidence do not foreclose the possibility that^ 
Montana Brand acquired actual knowledge of| 
the restrictions from some other sourelpl 
Thus, K & T and the Taylors were under n | | 
obligation to come forward with specific factjf-
showing that there was a genuine issue f<w£| 
trial. Cf. Utah R.Civ.P. 5Gtej. Because! 
Montana Brand did not demonstrate its enti-^ 
tlement to summary judgement based on aiJS 
undisputed fact, summary judgment was in?§ 
appropriate. Lcvab, S69 P.2d at 928. {>#4 
?•*£* 
[5] Montana Brand argues that even if j 
we find section 70A-8-204 inapplicable, wel 
should still affirm on a ground not reliedi 
upon by the trial court: to wit, that K &]¥% 
and the Taylors waived their right to enforc^ H 
the Stockholders' Agreement. Mcroanju 
Brand correctly points out that we rcay^^Eg 
firm a grant of nummary judgment on any<3 
ground, even one not relied upon by the trialjl 
court Whit* > D^eelhfn^t ^79 P2d 1371,^  
IO.U vLian iyy4;, iuoi L. inumi>un ^eitsp^i^ 
per.% 872 P.2d 999, 1012 n. 22 (Utah 1994^ 
nl 20 Hsjgins. P OA -sf o n "Howev-
siofl? er. any rationale for affirming a deeisiofl* 
must find support in t^e record." Hill P * 
Seattle Fint Natl Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246§ 
'Utah 1992) We fi«d no support in the4 
record for a grant of summary judgment$B# 
the waiver theorv. f^H 
[6] A \\ai\er is an intentional relinquish^ 
ment of a known right. Soters Inc. v- Deswm 
et Fed. Sav & Loan .4*0?. S57 P.2d ?38g 
939-40 (Utah 1993;. "Waiver requires t h ^ J 
elements: (1) an existing right, benefit,^|g 
advantage; (2; knowledge of its existenfigfi 
STATE v. 
Cite as 888 P.2d 
) an intention to relinquish the right." 
940. The intention to relinquish the 
nay be either expressed or implied and 
e implied from action or inaction. Id. 
Here, summary judgment on the is-
waiver would have been inappropriate 
e K & T and the Taylors have met 
Durden under rule 56(e) of the Utah 
of Civil Procedure to demonstrate that 
IS « . I * , . * . . . - i^-^-ivj / v l . ~ i . £ a l i i 
testified via affidavit as follows: 
i no time did any of the plaintiffs con-
to a pledge by Koroulis of his stock to 
t Security Bank ("FSB"). Although I 
approached in approximately March of 
by Richard Pope, a representative of 
I, twice in personal meetings (at loca-
51 can't recall) and various other times 
elephone, regarding plaintiffs' consent 
proposed pledge by Koroulis, plaintiffs 
ach instance refused to execute the 
I of consent agreement submitted by 
\— Subsequent to March of 1991 
itiffs had no further contacts with FSB 
koroulis (or anyone else) regarding the 
ge. 
i fact Koroulis told me subsequently, 
two separate occasions, in telephone 
•ersations, not to worry, he didn't need 
itiffs' consents, the first such occasion 
rring a day or two after the second 
>osed Consent Agreement was present-
o me (approximately March 28, 1991). 
u or about May 28, 1992, I received a 
T from counsel for Montana Brand 
luce Company. Inc In that letter, 
tana Brand claims ownership'of 15.000 
e- of K & T, Inc. stock previously 
ed by Koroulis. Plaintiffs' first infor-
on that the Pledge Agreement had 
i executed, or that Montana Brand 
ned an interest in the shares at issue, 
e upon plaintiffs' receipt of said letter 
i counsel for Montana Brand making 
fence to the Agreement. 
aintiffs at no time received notice from 
ttilis, as required by paragraph 1 of 
Stockholders' Agreement, regarding 
Proposed pledge to FSB and providing 
itiffs a right to exercise their purchase 
>n contained therein. 
CARTER Utah 629 
629 (Utah 1995) 
Accepting Taylor's statements as true, as we 
must do on appeal from a summary judg-
ment, Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 
104, 107 (Utah 1991), we are led to the 
inescapable conclusion that genuine issues of 
fact exist as to whether there was a waiver. 
We reverse the grant of summary judg-
ment and remand to the trial court for fur-
ther proceedings. 
STEWART, A.C.J., and HOWE, 
DURHAM and RUSSOX, JJ., concur. 
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party conveying stock to plaintiff. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Stewart M. Hanson, J., granted plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment, and de-
fendant appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Callister, C. J., held, inter alia, that maker's 
affidavit whereby he swore that he had 
been informed by third party that third 
party had in fact settled the account, being 
hearsay and based on information and be-
lief, did not conform to the requirements of 
rule and did not preclude entry of summary 
judgment. 
Affirmed. 
29 Utah 2d 58 
T E R N STATES THRIFT AND LOAN 
COMPANY, a corporation, Plain-
tiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Vayne T. BLOMQUIST, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 12872. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 18, 1972. 
iCtion was brought to recover on a 
ssory note, and maker pleaded as an 
lative defense that the obligation had 
compromised and settled by a third 
1. Judgment 0=^185.1(3) 
Affidavit supporting or opposing a 
motion for summary judgment must be 
made on personal knowledge of the affiant. 
set forth facts that would be admissible in 
evidence, and show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the mat-
ters stated therein. Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, rule 56(e). 
2. Judgment C=>I85.3(I6) 
On motion of plaintiff for summary 
judgment in action to recover on a promis-
sory note, maker's opposing affidavit 
wherein he stated that he was informed by 
third person that the third person had set-
tled the account in full, being hearsay and 
based on information and belief, did not 
conform to the requirements of rule, and 
did not constitute a showing of a genuine 
issue for trial sufficient to preclude entry 
of summary judgment. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rules 56, 56(e). 
3. Judgment 0 = 186 
There was no error in entering sum-
mary judgment for plaintiff at time wrier* 
interrogatories submitted to the plaintiff 
had not been answered, where there was 
no indication that the matter was Lrougbt 
to the attention of the trial court and 
where the time sequence, showing that in-
terrogator:) were bujmitted after filing of 
motion for summary judgment and long 
I. Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale. 121 Utah 359, 242 P.2d 297 (1952). 
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after institution of suit, indicated that in-
terrogatories were submitted as a tactic of 
delay. 
4. Appeal and Error <£=I073(I) 
Judgment C=>I84 
Ten-day notice requirement of summa-
ry judgment rule was not jurisdictional 
and alleged insufficiency of notice did not 
result in reversible error where defendant's 
rights were not adversely affected. Rules 
of Civil Procedure, rules 6(e), 56(c). 
Ronald C. Barker, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant-appellant. 
E. H. Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff-respondent. 
CALLISTER, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff initiated this action to recover 
on a promissory note, which defendant, as 
maker, had executed and delivered to 
plaintiff, as payee. Defendant as an af-
firmative defense, pleaded that the obliga-
tion had been paid by means of a compro-
mise and settlement by a third party, who 
had conveyed and delivered to plaintiff 
certain corporate stock. Plaintiff submit-
ted certain interrogatories to defendant, 
which were duly answered. Thereafter the 
court granted plaintiff's motion to produce 
all cancelled checks, receipts, money or-
ders, or other evidence of payments made 
by defendant to plaintiff as set forth in de-
fendant's answer to plaintiff's interrogato-
ries. Approximately ten months later, de-
fendant responded that after diligent 
search, he had been unable to locate any 
s-'ch papers. A few days later, plaintiff 
filed a motion for summary judgment, 
which was accompanied by an affidavit. 
Upon hearing, plaintiff's motion was 
granted, and plaintiff was awarded judg-
ment. Defendant's motion for a new trial 
was denied, and he appeals. 
Defendant contends that the trial court 
erred in granting summary judgment, since 
there was a disputed factual issue, specifi-
cally, whether the debt had been compro-
mised and settled by a third party convey-
ing stock to plaintiff. 
In response to plaintiff's interrogatories 
defendant claimed that one Xorman Havs 
had settled the claim. However, defendant 
specifically stated that he had no knowl-
edge of the date of the alleged compro-
mise, name of the stock delivered, or the 
number of shares. He knew of no docu-
ments evidencing the compromise. In re-
gard to a question, concerning payments 
and amounts, he cited dates prior to the 
date of the execution of the note (Decem-
ber 28, 1967); in fact, the latest payment 
claimed was May 24, 1967. Finally, de-
fendant responded "unknown" to an inter-
rogatory, concerning the value of the cor-
porate stock and how and by whom such 
value was determined. 
The affidavit accompanying plaintiff's 
motion, was a sworn statement by Mr. 
Green, plaintiff's manager, who swore to 
the execution and delivery of the note, and 
the fact that no payment had been made. 
He further stated that the note was a re-
newal for a prior existing obligation 
of defendant, upon which he had made 
payments, and for which he had been given 
full credit. The affiant further swore that 
at no time had anyone on behalf of plain-
tiff entered into a compromise agreement 
with a third par*y by the raine of Xorman 
Hays or any other person to settle the obli-
gation on behalf of defendant. 
Defendant filed an opposing affidavit, 
wherein he stated that the original loan 
was in his name and that of Xorman Hays, 
and that he was informed and believed that 
the picoent manager of plaintiff was not 
so employed at the time of the loan and 
subsequent renewals; and, therefore, the 
manager's affidavit was hearsay and im-
proper to support plaintiff's motion. De-
fendant swore that he was informed by 
Xorman Hays that he had, in fact, settled 
th** account in full by means of p^.;:~:*t in 
stock. Defendant stated that the note was 
not a new loan but a renewal of other 
notes to winch XToiman IIa \s was a party, 
and there was no balance owing. 
[1] \n ?ffiHp\it importing or oppos-
ing a motion for summary judgment is an 
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ntiary affidavit, whose form and con-
is governed by Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P. 
an affidavit must be made on person-
owledge of the affiant, set forth facts 
would be admissible in evidence, and 
affirmatively that the affiant is com-
lt to testify to the matters stated 
'in.* 
Affidavits containing statements made 
irely "on information and belief will 
disregarded. Hearsay testimony and 
inion testimony that would not be ad-
ssible if testified to at the trial may 
t properly be set forth in an affidavit. 
'] The assertions in defendant's affi-
t, which were essential to create a gen-
issue as to a material fact, were based 
nformation and belief and hearsay, and 
not conform to the requirements of 
i 56(e), U.R.C.P. Since defendant did 
beyond the allegations in his answer, 
forth by affidavit or otherwise as pro-
id in Rule 56, U.R.C.P., specific facts 
u'ing that there was a genuine issue for 
1, the trial court, based on the plead-
>, interrogatories, and the affidavit of 
ntiffs manager properly entered judg-
it. 
3] Defendant further contends that at 
time the summary judgment was en-
*d, he had submitted interrogatories to 
intiff, which had not been answered, 
i that the answers thereto might have 
lbhshed his defense of accord and satis-
tion. 
There is nothing in the record to indi-
e that this matter was brought to the at-
tinn of the trial court, i.e , there is no 
idavit to that effect. The interrogato-
s were filed after plaintiff had filed its 
Rainfonl v. Ryttins, 22 Utah 2*1 232. 2.15, 
451 P.2d 7bU tl^ot>) , iJre*ton v. Lumu. 
20 r t n h 2rl 200, 2G3, 436 P.2d 1021 (196S). 
motion for summary judgment. The time 
sequence strongly indicates that the inter-
rogatories were submitted as a tactic of de-
lay. The complaint was filed August 19, 
1970, and the answer on September 21, 
1970. Plaintiff's interrogatories were filed 
October 1, 1970 and the response on No-
vember 12, 1970. Plaintiff filed its motion 
to produce documents on November 19, 
and the motion was granted on November 
30, 1970. Thereafter, the record indicates 
total inactivity until September 9, 1971, 
when plaintiff filed a request for a trial 
setting. On October 1, 1971, defendant 
filed a response to the production of docu-
ment . On Octootr 12, i>71, plaintiff : \1 
its motion for summary judgment; the day 
after defendant filed his interrogatories. 
Under the circumstances of the instant 
case, the action of the trial court cannot be 
deemed inappropriate. 
[4] Defendant further asserts that the 
trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter 
judgment since the notice of hearing ac-
companying the motion set the date of 
hearing on October 18, 1971, a time less 
than the requisite 10 day notice provided in 
Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P. Defendant claims an 
additional three day period was required, 
since the service was by mail, Rule 6(e), 
U.R.C.P. 
Defendant has not cited any authority 
to the effect that the 10 d^y rotice require-
ment is jurisdictional. Under the circum-
stances of the instant case, the alleged in-
sufficiency of notice did not adversely af-
fect defendant's rights. The judgment of 
the trial court is affirmed. Costs to plain-
tiff. 
TUCKETT, ELLETT, HEXRIOD, and 
CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
2. 6 Moore's Federal Practice. § 56.22 [1]. 
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